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 Overhauling China’s Financial Stability Regulation: Policy Riddles and Regulatory Dilemmas 
Emilios AVGOULEAS  
Duoqi XU  
 
Abstract 
 
China faces a number of important financial-stability risks. A persistent feature of the Chinese 
banking sector is the rapid formation of non-performing loans (NPLs) during each business cycle. 
Moreover, lending restrictions and interest-rate caps (“financial repression”) have, in part, given rise 
to an ever-expanding shadow-banking sector. The article highlights five cardinal sins within the 
Chinese financial system: (1) bad lending practices by the regulated sector, (2) lax governance, (3) a 
shadow-banking system that is dominated by short-term claims with no liquidity backstop, (4) stark 
lack of transparency in the shadow sector, and (5) very high levels of interconnectedness between 
the shadow and the regulated sector. The article suggests that some of these problems will be 
alleviated through a regulatory big bang that would abolish the current silo approach to financial 
regulation streamlining financial stability and conduct/consumer-protection supervision. 
Furthermore, we recommend the introduction of a binding and all-encompassing leverage ratio that 
will require banks to hold much higher capital buffers as a means to boost bank resilience, reduce 
NPLs, and battle interconnectedness with the shadow sector. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Overview 
 
In the last three decades, China has posted impressive growth rates. During this period, there has 
not been a single social or economic indicator that has not improved from disposable income to 
percentage of population in full-time education and life expectancy. Between 1990 and 2008, 
Chinese growth came at the back of an investment-rich and export-intensive manufacturing sector. 
But, since 2008, domestic demand has taken off as well in many areas. This has led to a staggering 
expansion of credit in the Chinese economy and the suspicion of developing asset bubbles in the 
housing sector. 
Lower rates of growth for the global economy and the rise of cheaper regional competitors have 
meant a slowing-down in Chinese exports during recent years. This has had an adverse impact on 
the manufacturing sector, which has led to the accumulation on bank balance sheets of a large 
number of non-performing loans (NPLs) mostly extended to state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which 
also enjoy an implicit government guarantee for their debt funding. 1 Apart from the impact on 
growth that NPLs and debt overhang 2 bring, they also hinder efforts to augment governance 
standards within SOEs and to attract outside investment. While SOE bad loans are notoriously 
difficult to tackle without mounting expensive bailouts, their proliferation constitutes a regulatory 
paradox, since Chinese banks are subject to strict loan-to-deposits ratios and lending restrictions. 
The triple advent of rapid credit expansion, suspected asset bubbles, and mounting NPLs has made 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) financial system look fragile. 3 What makes things worse is that 
lending restrictions, interest-rate caps, and other credit-supply restraints and biases (so-called 
“financial repression”) have given rise to a relatively large shadow-banking sector, 4 depending, of 
course, to some extent on how shadow banking is defined, 5 given also the specific characteristics of 
the PRC shadow financial system. 6 
The development of the shadow-banking sector has been instrumental in the PRC’s financial 
development in the last decade, but it also gives rise to all kinds of financial-stability and consumer-
protection concerns. A large part of the shadow sector is nothing else but regulated banks doing 
business off the balance sheet. 7 Clearly, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) loan quotas are 
constraining the ability of most banks to lend as much as they would otherwise choose to do, 
inspiring a recent relaxation of lending caps, offering plenty of room for loan substitution by shadow 
operators, which, often, are bank-affiliate companies. Even more important are interest-rate caps on 
deposits, which act as a subsidy to the banking sector. At the same time, most banks are finding it 
difficult to raise inexpensive deposits sufficient to fund their loan growth. The caps on deposit 
interest rates have led many depositors to instead place money with the shadow-banking operators 
through the credit/investment products (so-called wealth-management products (WMPs)), shadow 
banks tend to offer. 8 
Arguably, an even more critical factor for the expansion of regulated banks in the shadow sector is 
the change of business model that regulated banks have undergone, which is well explained by 
Professor Shen Wei 9 while other studies have remained silent on this point. The fact that regulated 
banks have in recent years transformed themselves from being low-profit utilities that were lending 
for the long term and were content to base their income on interest-rate differentials to high return 
on equity business means that they have turned into loan origination and subsequent securitization 
of credits via the “originate-to-distribute” model to boost income. 
Beyond the aforementioned loan origination and distribution and the obvious channel of on-
balance-sheet loans that banks supply to non-bank financial institutions, the formal sector is 
connected to the shadow-banking sector in many other ways. First, bank affiliates sometimes have 
ownership stakes in trust companies or other non-bank financial institutions and, as a result, product 
mis-performance can become a hidden (contingent) bank liability. A trust company may make a loan 
to a bank client with the agreement that the bank will essentially buy the loan back by purchasing 
Trust Beneficiary Rights (TBRs). 10 Banks sometimes use TBRs as part of complex shadow-banking 
transactions to keep the economic benefits of a loan without showing it as a loan on their balance 
sheets, but moving it to a more favourably treated investment category. Second, banks may enter 
into repurchase agreements using loans or WMPs as collateral, so that the trust company knows 
that the ultimate economic risk will fall on the bank. The trust company’s own risk is therefore 
simply the counterparty risk of the bank. Other more recent products like directed asset-
management plans also blend the line between credit and investment, and increase bank exposures 
in ways that are less than transparent, 11 increasing bank vulnerability to future risks. Thus, the 
health of the shadow sector can offer grounds of serious concern for regulated banks (for a 
comprehensive discussion of the links of interconnectedness and interdependence between 
regulated banks and the shadow sector, see Section 2 below). 
Regulatory arbitrage and interest-rate arbitrage are the key factors behind the “ballooning” of the 
Chinese shadow-banking system, with speculation coming a close second. By skirting capital 
requirements, since they book most shadow financing as receivables, banks can rapidly increase 
their assets and, to some extent, profitability. But a large shadow-banking sector unsupported by a 
liquidity provider is at constant risk of financial instability. The first concern refers to maturity 
mismatches and the risk of inability to refinance. 12 Namely, what happens in the event of a credit 
crunch in the case that a multitude of contracts should be rolled over in a sector that operates 
without the protective net of a committed and adequately resourced liquidity provider like the 
lender of last resort (LoLR)? Overall, shadow-banking products provide the bulk of short-term-
funding liabilities within the Chinese financial system, raising the prospect of instability in the event 
of a sudden disappearance of liquidity. 13 
Second, there is the question of possible credit-risk migration. Shadow banks are highly leveraged 
and, given the absence of capital regulations, they will probably not be able to cover any credit 
losses relating to counterparty defaults. In particular, the brokers who intermediate the credit 
products marketed by the shadow sector do not have the balance sheet to cover eventual losses. If it 
all goes bad, the brokers do not have the balance sheet to support it, and somebody else should 
come and plug the losses. Namely, absence of capital regulations means that a number of shadow-
banking firms will probably not be able to cover credit losses relating to counterparty defaults. 14 So 
it is right to assume that banks still hold onto some of this credit risk. 
1.2 Summary of Proposals 
 
This article raises a critical question with respect to the PRC’s two biggest sources of financial-
stability risk: shadow-banking 15 risks and the tackling of NPLs. Is there a set of reforms that could 
make the growth versus financial-stability dilemma less acute and also add transparency to the 
financial system? In our view, the core of this question is twofold. First, could the highly ineffective 
silo approach to financial regulation that the PRC currently operates be replaced with a more 
effective system of financial-risk monitoring and prudential enforcement? Second, which set of 
regulatory measures could be implemented so that possible costs of restrictive regulation would not 
exceed the benefits of financial development? 
This article attempts to answer these questions by focusing on the role of PRC banks in this 
environment of mounting financial-stability challenges rather than the shadow sector itself, as is the 
case with other studies. We propose that financial-stability reform in the PRC should encompass a 
radical reconfiguration of the Chinese regulatory system to augment and streamline financial-
stability monitoring, microprudential supervision, and consumer protection. Our proposal is more 
radical than the mere introduction of a financial-stability council in the PRC and requires the radical 
restructuring of existing PRC financial regulators. 
Many commentators have debated whether the PRC shadow-banking sector should be regulated on 
its own, conceiving it as a system of financing that runs parallel to the banking system. But that is a 
fundamental misconception in terms of both conduct risk, which is rife, 16 and the structure and 
motives of expansion of the PRC shadow-banking system, which differs in several substantial 
respects from the US shadow-banking sector. As has been accurately noted, PRC shadow banking is 
bank-centric rather than a system sourcing finance through the (short-term) capital markets, as is 
the case in the US. It is also boosted by implicit guarantees rather than financial engineering. 17 
Finally, it is heavily reliant on retail funding rather being an efficient way to source wholesale 
funding, as is the case with its US counterpart. 18 The underdevelopment of the PRC market for 
securitized debt only serves to underscore this point. 
So, it may not be seen as a self-standing system of financing, even though it is not entirely parasitic; 
on the contrary, in the case of loans to small and medium enterprises (SMEs) or equity 
crowdfunding, it does serve genuine financing needs and aids financial development. Therefore, 
PRC’s shadow-banking system should be conceived as a more or less parallel banking system that 
short-circuits the regulated sector due to both opportunity to profit from arbitrage and counter 
financial repression. 
For this reason, in our view, the orderly operation of the PRC shadow-banking sector requires the 
improvement of the regulation of banks and a wider paradigm shift in the economy towards equity 
funding with a proliferation of risk-equity capital schemes moving away from the current model of 
funding for economic activity that is overwhelmingly debt-driven. 
This dual-track reform is necessary to both increase the resilience of banks and battle the effects of 
interconnectedness. As things stand, it is, ultimately, the regulated sector that will have to absorb 
any financial-stability shocks. 19 Therefore, to address financial-stability challenges facing the PRC 
financial system, we recommend higher levels of capital than the Basle III requirements as a first-line 
defence. While our proposals may seem too bold and out of line with earlier studies that suggest a 
piecemeal approach, it should be noted that our recommendations are much in line with the 
findings and suggestions of the more recent IMF Review of the PRC under Article IV. 20 In this 
context, we suggest the introduction of a binding and all-encompassing leverage ratio, which would 
catch off-balance sheet exposures, and whose breach would require near immediate replenishment 
of capital buffers rather than using it as a reporting tool, as is the current approach. 21 
System-wide leverage and interconnectedness within the shadow sector—which, of course, varies in 
the course of the leverage cycle—is identified as the major financial-stability risk of the PRC banking 
system by most foreign observers, including credit-rating agencies. 22 Such a measure will bring 
hidden exposures on the balance sheet or make banks accountable for them. Moreover, while it is 
commonly assumed that binding leverage ratios act as a constraint on lending, as capital is expensive 
to raise, this can prove inaccurate if the tax benefits for debt funding are reversed. Admati and 
Hellwig have proven that, in principle, assuming away tax disincentives (or, we add, weak balance 
sheets), equity funding should not be a more expensive way to fund loans than deposits. 23 
The government of the PRC has already imposed a number of comprehensive restrictions on self-
dealing and thus banks are no longer allowed to invest in their own WMPs. 24 Also, better 
provisioning is discussed in an attempt to clamp down on shadow-banking activity that is taken 
without adequate margins. 25 Yet, a clear and emergent danger is that banks may still manage to 
bypass such rules by means of complex investment products that have come to resemble 
collateralized debt obligations and worse. 26 Naturally, an all-encompassing leverage ratio will 
automatically shed light on many of those exposures and, even more importantly, on the way banks 
value them. It will also clamp down on complex accounting techniques that banks currently employ 
to move credit financing and attendant risk off the balance sheet. 
But leverage ratios may not be introduced on their own. They should be supplemented by the 
gradual abolition of current lending restrictions and interest-rate caps. In particular, the loans-to-
deposits cap makes no sense, as banks can easily fund loans through equity capital, 27 or even long-
term bond financing. Equity financing could also make up for any funding shortfall that all-
encompassing bank-leverage ratios may cause shielding the rate of the PRC’s financial development 
from any sharp deleveraging. 28 
The abolition of lending restrictions that have proved counter-productive and a gradual, yet 
wholesale, shift towards equity financing is bound to be much more than a piecemeal intervention. 
Offering strong incentives to equity-financed investment funds, including removal of any tax 
disincentives as well corporate law reforms, amounts of course to strong and centrally driven 
promotion of a culture of equity ownership. But it is a necessary leap that the PRC government 
seems willing to take. 29 
A rich vein of macroprudential research has highlighted the importance of the interaction of the 
credit channel with asset price levels and the impact of macroeconomic developments on financial 
stability. 30 In fact, while the previous paradigm examined the impact of the credit channel on levels 
of economic activity, 31 this new line of research looks at the impact of the macro-economy on 
financial stability. 32 Accordingly, this article discusses, inter alia, the role of all-encompassing 
leverage ratios as microprudential and macroprudential measures and indicates how these could 
improve financial stability in the Chinese financial sector and foster good bank governance. In this 
context, the article explores contemporary rationales and uses of leverage ratios in banking and 
explains the role of the leverage cycle in causing financial instability. It also discusses the perceived 
disadvantages of leverage ratios and points to contemporary empirical evidence that is largely 
dismissive of such concerns. But, in the case of highly leveraged economies like China, or the US in 
2008, or economies that are over-dependent on bank lending, leverage ratios could be a growth risk, 
unless they are accompanied by wholesale reforms, including tax measures, to augment equity 
investment across the board. 
This article is divided into six parts. The first part is the present introduction. The second part offers 
an analytical overview of the financial-stability challenges facing the PRC today, including a 
comprehensive discussion of the problem of bank NPLs and the nature of regulated banks’ 
exposures to shadow-banking risks. The third part discusses regulatory architecture theory and 
developments in the West since 2008 for the benefit of comprehensive comparisons with PRC 
regulatory architecture and reform. It focuses in particular on key micro- and macroprudential 
breakthroughs and the new wave of leverage ratios. The fourth part discusses the merits and 
potential demerits of leverage ratios and especially the possibility that these may have an impact on 
credit expansion in a given economy and thus affect growth. The fifth part sets out a proposal for 
radical reform of the PRC regulatory system and bank capital, and explains the nature of counter-
veiling measures to absorb potential funding shortfalls. While, at this stage, the discussion is more or 
less conceptual, it is hoped that we open the path for ensuing quantitative work that would, as we 
hope, robustly test the feasibility of our proposals. Finally, the sixth part brings together the 
different strands of the present analysis, offering a comprehensive conclusion. 
2. THE PRC’S FINANCIAL-STABILITY CHALLENGES AND THE REFORM DEBATE 
 
2.1 Why Are NPLs a Recurrent Problem in the PRC? 
 
2.1.1 The Drivers of NPL Formation within Chinese Banks 
 
Banks have completely dominated China’s credit system from the start of the era of “reform and 
opening up” in 1978 until shadow banking began to take off in the 2000s. Banks have inherited a 
privileged position in China, shored up by 33 : 
a captive customer base, since almost all lending until 2008 was done through banks, giving them a 
huge existing customer base, especially with the SOEs that dominated the economy; 
competition restrictions giving very few legal alternatives to bank deposits or bank loans in China’s 
highly controlled economy; 
implicit guarantees 34 —banks benefitted from a free implicit guarantee on their deposits, despite 
the lack of formal guarantees; this safety allowed banks to gather large deposit volumes despite 
paying low rates; 
controls on deposit and loan rates, as banks were subject to regulatory limits on the maximum 
deposit rate they could pay and the minimum loan rate they could charge; interest caps and ceilings 
could ensure healthy profit margins. 
At the same time, the state imposed significant constraints. In principle, the most important 
constraints have been the following 35 : 
Controls on loan volumes—the PBOC set limits for total loan volume by banks in aggregate and 
these limits were then apportioned out to individual banks. Given bank dominance of the financial 
sector controlling the volume of bank loans meant controlling overall money supply, which was an 
effective way to run Chinese monetary policy. These restricted bank lending to the SME sector. 
Micromanagement of lending that was often directed by important government or party officials 
made things worse for the SMEs sector. This type of directed lending is rarer today, except for 
smaller banks that are closely tied to regional or local governments, though overall strategic 
directing of credit remains. 
Strict loan-to-deposit ratios that do not allow banks to lend funds over 75% of their deposits. This 
has proved to be a serious constraint on loan growth, especially as the growth of bank deposits has 
slowed down sharply in the face of competing investment products. As a result, regulators recently 
allowed some non-traditional deposit inter-bank market lending to be counted towards the 75% rate 
to relax the lending cap a little. A key function of fractional reserve banks is to offer liquidity on 
demand by employing deposits to make loans, keeping only a fraction of them in reserve. 36 But 
bank loans (assets) can also be financed by more expensive means of funding, such as common 
equity and, in some cases, longer-term debt. If the cost of lending adjusts accordingly, then 
restricting bank lending by calculating it over a fraction of bank deposits is an inefficient means to 
restrict lending, especially as credit supply can migrate to the shadow sector. 
The high reserve requirements imposed by the PBOC, which seem to boost shadow lending and 
regulatory arbitrage. Banks are required to hold substantial reserves as deposits at the PBOC, 
earning rates far below what banks could earn on their normal business and even below their own 
cost of funds. This level varies, but currently about 19.5% of deposits must be placed with the PBOC. 
Deposits remain the major source of bank funding, so the reserve requirements represent a 
substantial cost in aggregate. 
State ownership—until 2004, the major banks in China were 100% owned by the state—which, by 
means of majority shareholdings, gives the government effective control of all major banks, 
particularly in personnel decisions, where the top management come from senior state positions 
and have not competed in a free labour market. So, their outlook is different from executives who 
have had private-sector careers. It is thus unsurprising that, even when directed lending was relaxed, 
banks kept favouring SOEs in their lending policies. 
Strong SOE lending bias due to risk factors—SOEs are also favoured because of implicit state 
guarantees and privileged favoured market positions, which make them safer borrowers. This 
tendency is reinforced by internal reward and punishment systems. A failed loan to an SOE is 
unlikely to be punished severely, while bad loans to the private sector can lead to job loss. Similarly, 
bank-manager career considerations make lending to entities run by powerful party members 
attractive. 
SME funding—a reverse bias. PRC banks have consistently shown an aversion to lending money to 
private-sector entities 37 and especially SMEs. This bias is of critical importance for both the 
historical development of the shadow-banking system and the PRC’s future economic growth. More 
recently, SMEs have been the backbone of Chinese growth, reportedly providing 70% of 
employment and 60% of China’s GDP [gross domestic product] in 2012, while they only received 
about 20–36% of bank lending during the same year. 38 While there has been a gradual 
improvement in terms of SOE-lending ratios, banks’ lending to the private sector still lags 
substantially behind lending ratios in other large economies—a bias that also affects to a significant 
degree bank profitability. The lack of long-standing and deep links between lenders and SMEs 
explains, in part, why the bulk of SME deposits go to the inter-bank market, where rates are not 
capped. But this places banks at a disadvantage when it comes to on-balance-sheet lending, given 
the aforementioned loans-to-deposits caps. 
The combined effect of aforementioned factors and especially the bias to extend loans to SOEs 
without adequate credit controls has meant that the PRC banks accumulated a large number of NPLs 
in both the pre-2008 and the post-2008 periods. Although China’s economy was less affected than 
other countries in the region during the Asian financial crisis, due to the relatively closed nature of 
its economy and financial sector back then, PRC banks accumulated a substantial number of number 
NPLs during that period. 39 These necessitated a number of reforms in 1998, which included: (1) 
recapitalization of state-owned banks; (2) adoption of international classification standards for NPLs; 
(3) enforcement of commercially viable loans to avert strategic defaults, whereby debtors default 
because the lender cannot effectively enforce the loan via the legal system; and (4) banning local 
governments from influencing lending decisions. 40 
Bank recapitalization was funded by the government’s issuing bonds valued at RMB 270 billion 
(Chinese yuan). 41 In 1999, four state-owned asset-management companies (AMCs) were 
established to transfer NPLs from the banks over a ten-year period. 42 Transfers of NPLs took place 
during 1999–2000, amounting to a staggering RMB 1.4 trillion—about 20% of the banks’ combined 
loan book, or 18% of GDP. 43 It has been estimated that this was less than half of the total NPLs. 44 
After implementation of these measures, NPLs dropped to around 20% in 2000, but it took until 
2004 for them to fall to a more manageable 13.2%; eventually, they fell to 2.4% in 2008 45 as a 
result of the strongest GDP growth. 
In 2004, the government decided to list the state-owned banks, starting the so-called “equitization” 
phase. To bolster the balance sheet of the Bank of China (BoC) and the China Construction Bank 
(CCB), which were floated first on the Shanghai and Hong Kong Stock Exchanges, the PBOC 
transferred RMB 320 billion in NPLs from the BoC and CCB to Asset Management Companies for 30–
40% of the book value. 46 The government also injected $45 billion of capital, which boosted capital-
adequacy ratios and supported new lending that could offset the impact of existing NPLs on bank 
profitability. 47 
The original AMCs are still operating today, maintaining distressed asset sales as their core business. 
China Huarong Asset Management (CHAM) is the largest AMC, having absorbed 55% or 264 billion 
yuan-worth of bank NPLs in the first half of 2016, and expects the second half of the year to yield 
similar results. 48 The Chairman of CHAM has noted that the quality of NPLs is deteriorating, making 
it harder to earn a profit, with the average disposal time being from one to three years. 49 
2.1.2 Tackling Bank NPLs Post 2008—a “Bottomless Pit”? 
 
Tackling NPLs has become an increasing concern for the PRC in recent months. As discussed below, 
the central government had to essentially mount yet another expensive and covert bailout of banks 
in the course of 2016. This new period started after the 2008 financial crisis, when the central 
government decided to implement a RMB 4 trillion economic stimulus and loosen up monetary 
policy, in contrast with earlier periods when the government controlled tightly the money supply. 
The loosening-up of the monetary base was transmitted through the banking system in the form, 
inter alia, of lower interest rates and new lending. 50 Such measures eventually became so 
widespread as to deviate from the original purpose, which was to use them as a monetary stimulus, 
and evolved into a replacement for a fiscal stimulus. 
However necessary the stimulus was, relaxed standards of bank supervision and loan underwriting 
meant that the PRC did not avoid a new crisis of NPL accumulation, even though it had just finished 
dealing with the last one. To this effect, Arner et al. note that “as growth rates have started to 
decelerate and the levels of private and corporate indebtedness have substantially risen in the post-
2008 period, this has led to a simultaneous and substantive increase in the level of assets prices and 
NPLs.” 
With NPL ratios among China’s commercial banks increasing for 19 consecutive quarters, debt to 
GDP standing at approximately 225% and increasing, and corporate debt at approximately 145%, the 
IMF among others has raised concerns calling for rebalancing measures. 51 The IMF conservatively 
estimates that, in 2016, Chinese bank corporate loan portfolio losses could equate 7% of GDP. 52 
Other sources note that official data show that NPLs at Chinese commercial banks jumped 51% in 
2015 to a decade high of RMB 1.27 trillion amid a stock-market rout and the worst economic growth 
in a quarter of a century. 53 This is more or less the official figure, as disclosed by the China Banking 
Regulatory Commission (CBRC) at the end of May 2016, which puts NPLs at RMB 1.4 trillion, or 
1.75% of total bank lending, on the back of 18 consecutive quarters of NPL growth. 54 In fact, 
according to the IMF’s April 2016 GFSR, more than 15.5% of a total USD 1.3 trillion PRC corporate 
debt may be at risk of default. 55 
However, even these figures are disputed by credit-rating agencies, which place capital shortfalls for 
commercial banks at 11–20% of PRC GDP. 56 The information gap is in part due to two factors. First 
there is the matter of lending transparency and transparency of exposures when lending is sourced 
outside of the traditional banking system remains. 57 Moody’s Investor Services has estimated that, 
in 2015, China’s shadow-banking system accounted for nearly 80% of GDP. 58 The second related 
problem is that loans to the shadow sector are invariably mischaracterized as investments and thus, 
when they do not perform, they are not accounted as NPLs, which means any restructuring would 
not appear on balance sheets as loan workouts, even if the IMF’s recommendations about banks 
moving to an explicit recognition of corporate workouts are adopted. 59 
Either way, these are large figures even for the world’s largest economy and a continuous risk to the 
stability of the regulated sector. Thus, the government is addressing the mounting NPL and bad-debt 
problems through the adoption a multi-pronged strategy. First, for the debt related to/generated by 
state-implicit guarantees, it actively encourages mergers or bankruptcies of technically insolvent 
companies, introducing a debt-for-equity swap programme and allowing provincial governments to 
establish AMCs. With regard to steel and coal companies defaulting on their debt, the CBRC has 
issued draft regulations to set up a debt-to-equity swap programme. Each swap involves three 
parties: the originator (creditor) bank, the SOE debtor, and a third-party executor. 60 Executors will 
consist of the big four banks, which will sell NPLs to AMCs. Upon receiving approval by the CBRC, 
distressed SOEs will exchange debt for equity, thereby strengthening their balance sheet at the 
expense of the purchasing bank’s balance sheet, before being sold to the AMC. Effectively, the debt 
is retained by the government until disposed of by the AMC, while, with each transaction through 
the chain, the NPL’s value is diminishing, spreading the risk among government agencies. Technically 
insolvent companies will be excluded from the programme. 61 The programme began its operations 
on 25 October 2016. 
However, the success of this multi-pronged strategy is still unproven, for a variety of reasons. First, 
in practice, the transfer of NPLs to AMCs amounts to an expensive bailout of the four main banks 
and a shifting of bad debt from the provinces to the centre. Second, the suggested debt-to-equity 
swaps run the danger of keeping alive so-called zombie SOEs, 62 as the IMF calls them. These could 
accentuate the misallocation impact of debt overhang and deprive from new credit viable 
companies. Thus, the IMF’s report on the recent PRC programme for NPLs suggests a robust test of 
corporate viability, which would have as an effect to push unviable SOEs to bankruptcy rather than 
artificially shoring them up through debt-to-equity swaps. 63 Of course, given the political clout 
exerted by SOEs, leadership and their regional government owners implementing the IMF 
suggestions in practice might prove a daunting task. Third, the debt-securitization solution may not 
be working due to a dearth of private buyers for bank NPLs, which means that sold assets end up 
with state-buyers or state-owned banks, essentially recycling rather than resolving the problem. 64 
Finally, given the aforementioned structural problems that also create uncertainty about the true 
value of NPLs, such as the difficulty to enforce contracts especially against SOEs, the development of 
a true secondary market for distressed debt, as the IMF rightly suggests, may be unattainable for 
now. That would mean that the central government would eventually have to absorb AMC losses 
into its budget. Therefore, in the face of slowing growth and mounting public debt and with banks 
haemorrhaging deposits, which entirely rules out the possibility of implementation of a bail-in 
regime, PRC authorities have clearly to shift attention to the prevention of NPLs. 
This shift in policy becomes ever more urgent given the rising volume of bad loans in the corporate 
sector, the escalating inability to serve them due to falling profits (Figures 1 and 2), 65 and the 
multiplication of housing loans granted by PRC banks in recent years. The latter have aided the 
significant rises in real-estate prices that clearly indicate a developing asset bubble in specific 
regional spots, rather than the country as a whole. 66 Even so, the impact on bank solvency of a fall 
in housing prices and a string of defaults due to the slowing economy is expected to be significant. 
 
Figure 1 IMF 2016 Source: IMF Working Paper (2016) 
 
Figure 2 IMF 2016 Source: IMF Working Paper (2016) 
2.2 The Chinese Shadow-Banking Sector and Channels of Risk Migration to the Regulated Sector 
 
2.2.1 Mapping the PRC Shadow-Banking Sector 
 
There is a wide range of estimates about the size of the shadow-banking sector in China, depending 
on the definition and the kind of activity that should be included in the total. 67 The latest reports 
put it at around 80% of PRC GDP. 68 But there are doubts whether these moderate estimates are 
accurate due to lack of transparency. On the other hand, the PBOC has devised a key index: the Total 
Social Finance Statistic, which may provide an up-to-date measure of bank and non-bank financing, 
though it lacks in granularity. 69 Yet figures may still be exaggerated due to the entrusted loans 
phenomenon. These are in the main loans made by parents of non-financial firms to subsidiaries 
that are run through banks for legal reasons. 70 The banks are indemnified for the credit risk of the 
borrower by the non-financial firm. 71 The motive of those loans can be clouded. A large number of 
entrusted loans appear to be lent within a corporate group. 72 But some entrusted loans are funded 
by SOEs as a way of profiting from their ability to borrow cheaply and in large volume by on-lending 
the funds they obtain. It seems that all entrusted loans to non-affiliates are motivated by the pursuit 
of short-term profit and they surge at periods when the flow of credit from the regulated sector is 
restrained. 73 
In principle, lending within a corporate group would not have to be considered as a shadow-banking 
activity and indeed most loans to affiliates are to support a member of the group rather engage in 
interest-rate arbitrage. 74 Yet loans to unrelated parties are on the rise, with large corporations 
using their stronger balance sheet to borrow money via Hong Kong banks to on-lend to smaller firms 
within China that face restricted access to PRC bank lending. 75 
Overall, it is difficult to separate intra-group and extra-group loans to unrelated parties. 76 
Moreover, even lending within the “group” in China may still be between entities that are only 
loosely connected and where the borrower may be allowed to fail without the failure of other 
members of the group. This classification problem leads to most calculations treating all entrusted 
loans as shadow-banking activity, even though this doubtless exaggerates the extent of shadow 
banking in China. At the same time, the true size of corporate on-lending may be grossly 
understated, as this activity is unregulated and unreported. 77 
Another development that impacts on the measurement of the PRC shadow-banking system is the 
new wave of Internet-based providers of payment services 78 —essentially an integrated payment-
collection service provided by the likes of AliPay and others, 79 initially funded by merchant fees. 
What brings Internet providers within the boundaries of shadow banking is that payment-service 
providers have leveraged their knowledge of users’ credit profile and they now offer Internet-based 
peer-to-peer (P2P) lending, 80 WMPs, and micro-lending to individuals and small loans to SMEs, 
alleviating the liquidity problems that the latter often face. 
These firms are at the heart of the FinTech revolution that has disrupted the way that financial 
services are provided. 81 Given the vast chunks of data that Internet finance providers can control 
and mine, and the cheaper cost base compared to traditional banks, combined with the higher yields 
they offer, such a development may seem inevitable. But, as we see below, there are risks, especially 
with respect to P2P lending. Moreover, if FinTech firms do indeed grow to become the principal 
providers of retail funding, their systemic importance may increase very significantly. 
2.2.2 Risks, Benefits, and Shadows 
 
As already mentioned, Chinese shadow banking is largely the result of interest-rate and regulatory 
arbitrage, and is thus a system that remains dominated by banks, which use it to avoid capital 
requirements while making substantial returns on loans masqueraded as investment products or 
other forms of financing that are classified as receivables. Elliott et al. calculate that perhaps two-
thirds of business into shadow banking is effectively “bank loans in disguise,” where a bank is at the 
core of the transaction and takes the bulk of risks and rewards, but pays non-banks to participate in 
order to avoid regulatory constraints and costs. According to the same study, the other third is due 
to cost advantages that non-bank institutions enjoy because of relaxed regulatory constraints and 
their willingness to lend to smaller players. 82 Essentially, a very large number of shadow-banking 
transactions such as the already discussed private-wealth products, loans and leases by trust 
companies, entrusted loans, bankers’ acceptances, leasing finance, guarantees through specialized 
firms, and TBRs involve the mediation of banks, and could even become a claim on the banks, 
depending on the circumstances. For example, in certain securitizations, the bank may substitute it 
for due payments to avert reputation risk. 
We explain below how, apart from the wealth products and TBRs discussed in the introduction of 
this article, other forms of shadow-banking activity can also create a long chain of interdependence 
and interconnectedness between not just shadow operators and regulated banks, but also between 
regulated banks themselves, 83 even though the exposure either does not appear on bank balance 
sheets or the risk of the transaction is not accurately reflected. These transactions expose regulated 
banks not only to the risk of counterparty insolvency, opening the gates for credit-risk migration to 
the regulated sector, but also to the risk of counterparty illiquidity that could, in the absence of a 
liquidity backstop, change into a generalized liquidity shock. 84 
In the next few paragraphs, we identify specific shadow-banking operations and practices that are 
particularly responsible for the generation of links of interconnectedness between the regulated and 
the shadow sector. 
2.2.3 Interconnectedness, Credit-Risk Migration, and Liquidity (Refinancing) Risk 
 
Trust loans and leases are financial transactions undertaken by trust companies—a separately 
regulated type of firm that combines elements of banks and fund managers. Before a recent 
tightening-up of the rules of their operation, trust companies had wide latitude to operate across 
the financial sector. The key question in this case is how the trust company has sourced the loans it 
provides. If the money comes from the banks and the trust company is merely performing interest-
rate arbitrage or acts as a bank subsidiary, there is ample scope for credit and liquidity-risk 
migration, though such (contingent) exposures may not be reported. 
Bankers’ acceptances are certificates issued by banks that promise unconditionally to make a future 
payment, usually within six months, and are generally backed in part by a deposit from the party 
desiring the bankers’ acceptance to be issued. In a way, they are no more than a certificate of 
deposit used to back commercial transactions such as purchases of inventory, where the seller 
receives the acceptance as a substitute to cash collateral. Acceptances are negotiable and may be 
sold by the holders at a discount rate prior to the maturity date, often back to the issuing bank. The 
fact that the acceptances are transferable can lead to multiplication of transfers of the same 
acceptance, transforming a modest deposit into a much larger one. Thus, borrowers can create 
money-multiplication spirals by using the acceptance to obtain a loan based on the discounted value 
of the acceptance and then use these funds to make a new deposit to back a further, larger 
acceptance. In this way, “acceptances” build leverage in the financial system and the economy, since 
the initial deposit has gradually turned into a large, off-balance-sheet loan from a bank. Since 
acceptances can be used as quasi-money, this practice leads to the formation of a parallel system of 
fractional reserve banking whose net exposure is hard to calculate, as it would require concurrent 
netting and set off of all acceptances. 
Interbank entrusted loan payments: these are loans that one bank makes to another bank’s client on 
the second bank’s behalf. As the entrusted payment matures, the first bank will receive principal and 
interest paid by the second bank. Naturally, this form of financing creates large levels of 
interconnectedness, making the first bank totally dependent on the solvency and liquidity of the 
second bank and not merely of the borrower. 
Guarantee companies participate in shadow-banking activities first by having as their core business 
the provision of financial guarantees, transferring the credit risk to the guarantee firm to reduce 
capital requirements for banks that make such guaranteed loans to the shadow-banking sector. 
Second, many guarantee companies make direct loans themselves, lacking a licence to do so. This 
practice increases interconnectedness between regulated banks and the shadow sector. As the final 
health and robustness of guarantee companies are unknown and it is unclear how they manage their 
exposures, any concurrent call on their guarantees, in the event of a string of defaults, will probably 
mean collapse of the guarantee companies and risk repatriation for the bank that tried to offload 
risk by using the guarantee, weakening its financial base. 
Inter-bank market activities act as a substitute for formal deposits using the inter-bank market, 
although the majority of participants are not banks, but large corporations using finance-company 
subsidiaries to participate. Under such arrangements, corporations can lend money to banks in 
deposit-like arrangements without being subject to the caps on deposit rates and without forcing 
banks to incur many of the regulatory costs of deposits, such as triggering the minimum-reserve 
requirements. However, any temporary withdrawal of such “loans” can cause a refinancing risk in 
the regulated sector, leading to calls for LoLR support. 
Furthermore, the regulated sector may maintain invisible links with the shadow-banking sector, 
creating interconnectedness and channels for migration of liquidity and bankruptcy risk. In 
particular, the already discussed WMPs, which are predominantly short-term, 85 can be the perfect 
conveyor belt for repatriating bankruptcy risks to the regulated sector and not necessarily through 
contractual or other explicit legal links, 86 but even more likely through the contagion triggered by 
reputation risks and loss of confidence. 87 
Another invisible, in principle, risk-transmission channel relates to P2P-lending platforms and it is 
much less debated than the widespread frauds perpetrated by P2P operators in the first few years of 
the emergence of these platforms. 88 P2P platforms in China currently operate under three models. 
89 First, the platform is used to simply match lending and borrowing information. Second, the 
platform may be supported by operator (or its affiliates) guarantees or credit-enhancement facilities 
or may merely sell such products. Third, the platform may offer repackaging and sale-of-credit assets 
through securitization and other financial-engineering techniques, whereby the P2P platform issues 
“WMPs” to raise money for purchasing credit assets from affiliates of P2P platforms. Fourth, the 
platform may facilitate the transfer of credit assets created by its operator or its affiliates to end 
investors—whereby the P2P platform or its affiliates extend certain loans to borrowers first and then 
sell these loans through the P2P platform to end investors. 
The second, third, and fourth models amount to the provision of straightforward credit-
intermediation services and, similarly, the third and the fourth form of P2P platforms may also offer 
covered or uncovered loans. Interconnectedness could be further accentuated if P2P platforms are 
used to sell bank-credit assets. In addition, the four types of P2P business models involve liquidity 
risks, as there may be liquidity mismatches if the platform takes in short-term investments from 
clients on a rolling basis to fund long-term assets in the pool. In this case, any confidence crisis may 
spill over to the regulated sector, even if there are no explicit and implicit links between the P2P 
operator and regulated-sector institutions. 
Thus, it is paradoxical that the P2P platforms that intermediate credit, rather than just matching 
interested borrowers and lenders, are not licensed/regulated like banks. Simply put, the mere 
imposition of capital requirements on P2P operators is possibly insufficient, as it is unclear whether 
the practice of P2Ps’ extending loan guarantees and loan securitizations has abated even after the 
requisite prohibition of these activities in November 2016. 90 
Another development that may link Chinese banks with lending channelled through the shadow 
sector is the emergence of so-called “directed asset management plans [AMPs].” The new shadow 
channels work like trusts, with a bank investing proceeds from its WMPs in a directional plan that 
then lends to a borrower chosen by the lender. This extension of credit can circumvent restrictions 
on certain borrowers, like local government financing vehicles, as well as capital requirements. The 
amount of money placed in such products jumped by 70% last year to RMB 18.8 trillion (USD 2.9 
trillion), outpacing the 17% growth for trust assets, according to data provided by industry groups. 
91 
Finally, the rise of money-market funds (MMFs) like the aforementioned Yu’e Bao is not free of 
concern and systemic stability implications. As discussed, given the close connection between 
China’s banking and non-banking credit sectors, it is not surprising that nearly 90% of Yu’e Bao’s 
portfolio consists of bank deposits, short-term debt paper issued in the inter-bank market, and cash 
deposited with depositary and clearing agencies which settle and clear money-market instruments. 
While limiting their participation in securitization deals and other money-market instruments, many 
other MMFs also invest the majority of their portfolios with banks to earn more interest. This is 
because MMFs’ deposits are not subject to the aforementioned interest-rate caps and thus banks 
can offer MMFs a relatively higher interest rate, in particular at times when the inter-bank market is 
short of liquidity. In fact, some investors may have withdrawn their bank deposits to invest with 
MMFs in order to obtain a higher return. 92 
MMFs are a classic example of how the liquidity (and credit risks) borne by the shadow operators 
may migrate to the regulated sector. Chinese MMFs typically have a constant net asset value (NAV). 
93 But an MMF’s constant NAV may not reflect the real value of the MMF when the number of 
redemption requests is significant, since, in such a case, the MMF would be required to fast realize 
its investments (at possible discount prices) to meet the cash payout requirement. This redemption 
structure poses a liquidity risk for the regulated sector as well as the MMFs themselves. MMFs 
currently place the bulk of their portfolios with banks either as deposits or with the short-term bank 
paper. Moreover, funds placed in other (than deposits) money-market investments are maintained 
in the same pool. Yu’e Bao and many MMFs offer T+0 redemption for any amount not exceeding a 
specific threshold. 
Even setting aside the real risk of firesales to meet a sudden surge of repayments/redemptions, a 
large MMF investor exit during any panic scenario, such as when they realize that the value of their 
investments in MMFs is far from guaranteed, can create a sudden withdrawal of MMF deposits from 
commercial banks to cover their liquidity needs. In these cases, MMFs can transfer unexpected 
liquidity shocks to the regulated sector. The best example of an MMF investor panic is the US 
Reserve Primary money-market fund debacle—the so-called “break the buck” incident. 94 
Therefore, systemic risk may increase due to MMFs’ higher susceptibility to “runs,” because they 
present a significant retail investor base and, at the same time, investors treat their investments 
with MMFs like principal protected deposits (as a result of constant NAV and T+0 redemption 
features). 95 One solution for the risks that MMFs pose would be to adopt a floating NAV, since the 
fund’s assets are also floating at redemption. Another is to impose generalized “gating” restrictions 
at the discretion of the fund’s management. In fact, both measures should be adopted to stabilize 
the PRC MMFs even if they lose business. However, above all, what ought to be done is interest-rate 
liberalization to make bank deposits more competitive vis-à-vis MMF products. 
2.3 PRC Regulatory Architecture for the Financial Sector and the Reform Debate 
 
2.3.1 Overview 
 
China follows a silo approach to financial regulation, which has drawn a fair amount of criticism. 96 
Since 1993, China’s nascent financial sector was regulated by the PBOC, the central bank of China, 
which, in addition to monetary-policy powers, had the competence to formulate and implement 
fiscal policy, and to regulate and supervise the banking industry. 97 Following the amendment of the 
Commercial Banks Law in 2003, the banking supervisory and regulatory responsibilities of PBOC 
were transferred to the China Banking Regulatory Commission (hereinafter “CBRC”). The move to 
create specialized regulatory bodies under the State Council in 2003 (the “three agencies one bank” 
system) signalled the Chinese government’s intention to modernize and consolidate regulatory 
structure in the financial sector by developing expert regulators. The PBOC remained the central 
bank and could still exercise considerable regulatory power over all financial institutions in China in 
order to maintain the overall stability of financial markets. It also retained monetary-policy 
competence, acting as LoLR. 
The CBRC’s remit includes banks, financial-asset managers, trust and investment companies, and 
other depositary financial institutions. Its responsibilities include approving new banking licences, 
formulating prudential rules, and conducting compliance examinations. It also formulates 
supervisory rules governing the banking industry. The China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC) regulates and supervises the securities and futures markets, and enforces sanctions. The 
China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC) regulates the insurance industry. It should be noted 
that the sectoral regulators do not enjoy hierarchical independence in the same mode as Western 
regulators, even if they enjoy operational independence. Rather, they are parts of the wider public 
administration machine and are often headed by career bureaucrats. 
The sectoral regulators produce so-called second-tier laws consisting of administrative rules and 
regulations enacted by the State Council, the highest administrative authority of China. The third tier 
consists of CBRC’s Guidelines, notices, and rules. Most of CBRC’s regulatory initiatives fall into this 
category. In general, the third-tier regulatory initiatives serve as the base of China’s banking 
regulations and deal with contemporary regulatory issues. 
2.3.2 Responsibility for Financial Stability and Fractured Monitoring Lines 
 
Although overarching responsibility for financial stability resides with the State Council, the highest 
executive authority, the Law of the People’s Bank of China as amended in 2003, gives the PBOC 
responsibility to guard against systemic financial risk and maintain financial stability. 98 During the 
global financial crisis (GFC), responsibility for financial stability was exercised by a high-level 
committee of key financial agencies, which was established to regularly assess conditions and 
consult on policy actions. Each of the agencies had contingency plans in place to respond to a crisis, 
including memoranda of understanding (MOUs) to promote co-operation. The efforts of Chinese 
authorities to rapidly deploy a range of macroprudential measures to cool off overheating property 
markets was testimony to the strong administrative capacity of the State Council and its ability to 
respond to near-term systemic threats. But, from an operational perspective, responsibility for 
financial stability is largely taken by the four agencies, though the centre-piece in this sometimes 
unwieldy institutional jigsaw is the PBOC. The Law on the PBOC specifically charges the bank with 
responsibility to guard against systemic financial risks and the maintenance of macro-financial 
stability. In addition, the PBOC implemented the Deposit Insurance Act in May 2015 99 and various 
macroprudential policy tools. In particular, the PBOC put in place a Macro Prudential Assessment 
framework (e.g. differentiated reserve requirements) to guard against systemic risk. Moreover, the 
PBOC takes the lead in enhancing inter-agency co-ordination through the Financial Crisis Response 
Group directly under the State Council and the Financial Regulatory Coordination Joint Ministerial 
Committee (JMC). 
Other government agencies, outside of the sectoral regulators that may have a role in safeguarding 
financial stability, are the Ministry of Finance, whose responsibilities include, inter alia, debt issuance 
and the management of state-owned assets, and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, 
which has custody of foreign exchange reserves. Together, these two agencies provide the 
government with very substantial “financial backstops.” Currently, inter-agency co-operation and 
information-sharing in China are underpinned by a series of MOUs between the CSRC, CBRC, and 
CIRC. The PBOC also has developed Interim Rules on Information Sharing with the three financial 
regulators. In late 2013, these financial regulators set up a joint financial-stability co-ordination 
mechanism. Formal quarterly Joint Working Meetings of the regulators and joint reviews of financial 
intermediaries are held on a periodic basis. In addition, the Investor Protection Bureau was 
established in the PBC, CSRC, CBRC, and CIRC to strengthen the co-ordination of investor protection. 
The institutional separation of functions among the PBC, CBRC, CSRC, and CIRC keeps, in theory, 
each institution’s focus on its mandate, helping to keep them accountable. In addition, the lack of 
institutional integration avoids creating a single dominant entity that over-concentrates powers and 
might miss key risks or fail to take important action due to “groupthink”—an accusation validly 
launched against the former single regulator in the UK, the Financial Services Authority (FSA). A key 
lesson of the GFC, however, is that inter-agency co-operation must be equally effective in normal 
periods, so that any build-ups of risks can be identified and addressed well before they evolve into a 
systemic event. In other words, an effective macroprudential policy framework is one in which 
financial agencies not only share their concerns on emerging risks, but also work closely together to 
prevent them. 
China has made progress in improving its institutional arrangements for co-ordination in regulating 
the financial system during the past decade. Despite these steps, there remain gaps and regulatory 
overlaps. It is not clear that the existing protocol would always provide each agency with speedy 
access to the information from other sectors that is needed to assess the overall soundness of the 
financial systems. This is an important issue because legal hurdles and obstacles to information 
collection and sharing among agencies have proved to be major impediments to the early 
assessment of systemic risks in many countries. 
With Circular No. 107/2013, PRC authorities clarified regulatory responsibility for the shadow-
banking sector adhering to the sectoral or silo approach. 100 But this approach is clearly flawed both 
vis-à-vis firm and product regulation multiplying oversight fragmentation with some products like 
WMPs being assigned to multiple regulators and innovative markets trading securitized debt having 
no clear regulator. 101 The most important risk of such fragmentation of oversight is, of course, that 
systemic-risk nodes and channels of interconnectedness between the shadow and the regulated 
sector may go unnoticed. 
There are other key weaknesses in the silo approach. First, as the Financial Stability Board (FSB) 
notes, there is insufficient collecting and sharing of cross-sector granular data, which is a key 
shortcoming, since China has not established a national, credible data- collection system to gather 
more granular data. Second, there is insufficient cross-sector analysis on systemic risk. The PBOC 
devotes considerable resources to financial stability and publishes a comprehensive annual Financial 
Stability Report (FSR). But, as the FSB report notes, the FSR should include more analysis of the 
interconnectedness across sectors and markets in depth to explore the potential sources of risks. 
The key financial-stability issues should be discussed in depth to replace the list of financial 
developments and risks. Moreover, room exists for improvement in the comprehensive surveillance 
of systemic risk. 102 
Third, there is insufficient policy co-ordination. Several characteristics of the economy, financial 
sector, and policy framework in China make policy co-ordination a particularly important tool. For 
instance, the interest-rate policy is constrained by the relatively inflexible exchange-rate regime, as 
well as the gradual opening of the capital account. Fiscal policy—particularly government 
spending—also has limitations as a countercyclical tool. It is not always flexible enough to prevent 
credit booms and the build-up of systemic risk in the financial sector. 103 Moreover, the importance 
of real estate as a major asset class for retail investment, 104 the fact that underdeveloped financial 
markets provide limited risk-management tools, and the shortcomings in crisis-resolution 
frameworks highlight the need for policy co-ordination to identify and monitor systemic risk in the 
financial system. This is also the key theme of the FSB’s most recent peer review of the PRC financial 
system. 105 
As part of the reform debate and in order to streamline financial-sector regulation, several ideas 
have been mooted, including proposals for the creation of a super-agency for financial regulation 
placed under the PBOC. The super-agency is planned to co-ordinate monetary and financial 
supervisory policies and information-sharing between these regulators and to supervise legislation, 
without changing the roles of the incumbent institutions. Other ideas that have also been floated 
include the creation of a macroprudential council. 106 
In our view, super-agencies have at best a mixed record. 107 Yet the observations above about inter-
agency co-operation and information-exchange arrangements significantly strengthen the argument 
that the PRC needs a regulatory “big bang.” This in our qview should see the current silo approach 
replaced by a system that integrates the process of monitoring of financial-stability risks, 
microprudential risks, and investor-protection risks (and enforcement) without resorting to the 
establishment of a single mega-regulator—a solution that would carry serious shortcomings. For this 
reason, we suggest a configuration of PRC regulation along regulatory objectives that would be 
premised on the mixed approach rather than sticking to either the functional or institutional method 
of regulation. Our proposal model reflects a “twin-peaks”-plus model and it comes closest to the UK 
financial architecture, discussed in Section 3 below, although we envisage the macroprudential body 
as one with the power to order directly the different parts of the regulatory and financial system. In 
this context, we envisage that the augmented CBRC would become a microprudential regulator for 
the entire financial sector, with a merged CSRC and CIRC as conduct, market-abuse, and consumer-
protection regulator. 
In addition, the gaps in information-sharing necessitate the establishment of a body with overall 
responsibility for macroprudential policy in the PRC and binding powers and not just a cross-agency 
or even supra-agency monitoring mechanism, since the current arrangements in the PRC can easily 
open fractured lines. 108 Thus, our model also includes a macroprudential body with full 
enforcement powers that sits within the PBOC (for the full proposal, see Section 5 below). An 
approach to financial regulation based on regulatory objectives like the one described above that 
would break down the silos would also offer regulators a much better idea of cross-sectoral 
connections and risks, including an accurate mapping of bank exposures in the shadow-banking 
sector. This way, regulators could gain a thorough view of shadow-banking risks. In addition, the 
consumer-protection body could pursue investor-protection infringements against both authorized 
and non-authorized persons. Finally, breaking down the silo approach would mean much less inter-
institutional rivalry and turf wars that normally result in the blocking of important reforms. 
3. A MACROSCOPIC VIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS IN REGULATORY ARCHITECTURE AND LEVERAGE 
RATIOS IN THE US, EU, and UK POST 2008 
 
3.1 The Reform of Regulatory Architecture 
 
Prudential regulation has undergone seismic changes in the post-2008 period, at least in the US, EU, 
and UK, as a result of the so-called GFC. The new prudential regime is increasingly shaped up at the 
global (Group of 20 (G-20), FSB) or the regional level (the EU) or driven by developments in key 
jurisdictions (e.g. the US). Gradually, the regulators’ armoury expanded to include, apart from 
licensing and ongoing compliance requirements, widened deposit-insurance schemes, ex ante 
recovery, and resolution planning 109 for financial institutions, including banks, revamped corporate 
governance and remuneration standards, and a radically reconfigured structural framework. In 
addition, capital requirements have been overhauled and new liquidity requirements have been 
introduced. 
The post-2008 prudential regime is complemented by an expansive and intrusive recovery and 
resolution framework, which aims to eliminate, or at the very least drastically reduce, the possibility 
that a financial institution becomes too big to fail. Where resolution and prudential regimes overlap 
is in the area of early intervention, so-called prompt corrective action (PCA) (pre-insolvency 
regimes). Moreover, new ideas have been implemented to further shore up bank capital to either 
keep a failing bank as a going concern through prompt recapitalization or resolve it in an orderly 
manner, in order to put an end to bank access to public funds. This approach is supposed to 
eradicate, to some extent, the moral hazard that is normally associated with bailouts. As such, a new 
class of contingent capital instruments (so-called CoCos) 110 was introduced. These may be 
converted into equity to shore up bank capital before the bank enters into resolution, thus avoiding 
having to push banks through disruptive resolutions. In addition, a certain portion of bank liabilities 
may be used to restore a failing bank to health under the new bail-in process introduced under Title 
II of the Dodd-Frank Act 111 in the US, the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) 112 in the 
EU, and the more recent Total Loss Absorption Capacity (TLAC) requirements. 113 
Critically, a new approach to prudential regulation was introduced—so-called macroprudential 
regulation. Under this framework, regulators have responsibility to look at the resilience of the 
financial system as a whole and the way it interacts with the wider economy, including the possible 
formation of asset bubbles, since the latter, normally, have deleterious effects on financial stability. 
In this context, a number of new measures such as leverage ratios, countercyclical capital 
requirements, and lending controls (like loan-to-value and loan-to-income ratios) have both a micro- 
(institutional stability) and a macroprudential objective (systemic stability). This is a very important 
development. Goodhart has accurately suggested that central banks have always had this dual role: 
maintaining price stability and financial stability. 114 
3.2 Revamping Bank Supervision and the Question of Optimal Regulatory Architecture 
 
Broadly speaking, there are three approaches to structuring the supervision/regulation of the 
financial sector: the institutional approach, the functional approach, and the objectives-based 
approach. In practice, financial supervision and regulation can be organized as a combination of 
these three approaches. 115 The institutional approach means that the regulator is essentially 
focusing on the supervision of individual institutions. This approach is regarded as very apt for the 
regulation of banks. 116 Its distinct advantage is that regulatory overlaps and turf wars are avoided 
and there is a single public agency to hold accountable in the event of regulatory failure. On the 
other hand, disintermediation, diversity of activities, technology, and financial innovation are 
gradually rendering ineffective regulation that runs along institutional lines. 
As discussed below in Section 3.3, in the case of China, breaking down regulatory silos is a very 
important factor in terms of regulatory ineffectiveness. A better integrated and co-ordinated model 
of regulation with clear lines of functional responsibility, especially vis-à-vis financial stability and 
conduct/consumer-protection regulation, would necessarily have to look at the challenges that 
shadow banks pose in both respects. 
The functional approach focuses on the kind of business undertaken by financial firms. In principle, 
the functional approach provides three main benefits: (1) regulatory neutrality; (2) a level playing 
field: the regulator applies the same rules to all regulated firms that perform the same activity; and 
(3) it allows firms to select the precise services they wish to offer and, thus, it best supports financial 
innovation. 117 An important limitation of the functional approach in this era of complex and 
interconnected global markets is over-specialization, where the overall state of the regulated 
institution escapes regulatory attention. 118 
In practice, the two approaches are complementary. Goodhart et al. have argued that a strict 
dichotomy between the institutions- and functions-based approaches is misleading. 119 Financial 
institutions need to be regulated both in order to safeguard their safety and soundness and to make 
them uphold the highest standards in the way they conduct their business and treat their customers. 
120 Given the financial-stability externalities created by the operation of financial institutions and 
especially by banks and the market failures—and often sharp practice that, on occasion, borders on 
fraud—pervading banks’ dealings with consumers, the mixed approach is the better argued and 
more justified one. In addition, the mixed approach also allows for competitive regulatory neutrality, 
securing a playing field for prudential regulation and equitable treatment of firms when it comes to 
compliance with the conduct of business regulation. 
The most adaptable form of the mixed approach is the objectives-based approach under which 
financial intermediaries and markets are subject to oversight and scrutiny by more than one 
authority, each of which is responsible for one objective of regulation regardless of the legal form of 
the regulated intermediaries and/or of the activities they perform. The aim is to create a structure 
that reflects the objectives of regulation and, at the same time, it promotes those objectives most 
effectively and efficiently. 
An example of the objectives-based approach is the twin-peaks structure advocated by Taylor in 
1995, which comprised two regulatory agencies: one responsible for ensuring the soundness of the 
financial system and the other focusing on consumer protection. 121 The most important criticism 
levelled against this model was that the number of regulators seemed to depend on the view that 
each must have only one objective, but investor protection and systemic-risk oversight are not easily 
separable. 122 The alternative would be consolidating all financial regulation within a single agency. 
Until 2008, two discernible structures underpinned bank supervision. The first divided responsibility 
for prudential regulation and the second concentrated all regulatory/supervisory powers for the 
financial sector within a single institution—a mega-regulator. In the UK, all prudential and conduct 
regulation was entrusted to a single mega-regulator, in the case of the UK to the FSA. But, even 
where prudential regulation was entrusted to a single agency or a constellation of agencies 
independent of the central bank, the central bank still had some role in prudential regulation. 123 It 
would have a large hand in supervising the payments system, it would be in possession of important 
information for prudential regulation, and it would be the body that, in a crisis, would make 
available LoLR facilities. 
The lessons drawn on the GFC experience have also profoundly affected the style of bank 
regulation/supervision. A key conceptual distinction that reflects recent regulatory practice is that 
between microprudential and macroprudential regulators. Most of the post-reform microprudential 
regulators are either parts of a central bank or a wholly owned subsidiary of the central bank. In 
general, central banks have acquired a mandate to protect financial stability and act as 
macroprudential supervisors 124 or, at the very least, as the dominant part of new macroprudential 
bodies. 125 Financial-stability powers/competences given to key central banks are in addition to the 
exercise of their powers as monetary authorities. For example, the current mission of the Bank of 
England is to promote the good of the people of the UK by maintaining monetary and financial 
stability, the latter being the objective of the UK’s macroprudential supervisor, the Financial Policy 
Committee. The obvious exception to this trend is the US, where the systemic-risk regulator, the 
Financial System Oversight Council, established under Title I of the Dodd-Frank Act, is a more 
pluralistic body in terms of composition and membership, 126 being chaired by the Secretary of the 
Treasury and housed at the US Department of the Treasury. 
Arguably, post-2008 regulatory/supervisory structures in key Western jurisdictions (Eurozone, US, 
UK) look like the twin-peaks (plus). Moreover, central banks, such as the US Federal Reserve Board 
(FRB), have seen their role as microprudential regulators strengthened or, like the Bank of England, 
they have resumed their role as prudential regulators. Thus, FRB’s primary objective is, inter alia, 
“evaluation of the overall safety and soundness of a banking organization.” 127 Similarly, the 
primary objective of the UK’s Prudential Regulation Authority, a subsidiary of the Bank of England, is 
to “promote the safety and soundness of the firms it regulates.” 128 
3.3 Introduction of a New “Generation” of Leverage Ratios 
 
3.3.1 Overview 
 
a) The Impressive Return 
 
Discarded as too blunt since the early 1980s, today leverage ratios have made an impressive and 
largely unopposed return and not just as a supplement to risk-weighted capital requirements 
(RWAs), but also a regulatory requirement that has to be complied with regardless of the RWA 
indicators. The reasons for this return are manifold and are not limited to the fact that bank-equity 
levels in the wake of GFC were exceptionally thin, necessitating a string of costly bailouts. Four other 
factors have been as important. First, all-encompassing leverage ratios that catch off-balance-sheet 
exposures are more representative of banks’ overall risk profile and capital position. Second, the 
world is in revulsion with high debt following the GFC and the Eurozone crises. Third is the universal 
acceptance of Hyman Minsky’s ideas about the nature of the financial system and its role in the real 
economy, 129 especially when debt levels become unsustainable, triggering a chain of defaults. 
Fourth is the experience of the GFC and ensuing research on the role of the financial sector as an 
agent of instability. 130 This shifted regulatory attention from the level of individual financial 
institutions (microprudential regulation) to a systemic level (macroprudential regulation). 
b) The Key Questions of Definition and Ambit: Is There an Optimal Leverage Ratio? 
 
Bank-capital requirements are a key tool in regulators’ armoury because bank capital can serve 
several key functions, including being used as a cushion for absorption of bank losses, as risk 
restraint, and as a market-monitoring and discipline mechanism. On the basis of these assumptions, 
bank failures should be a very rare phenomenon in the era of Basel Capital Accords. However, 
flawed capital structures were one of the most decisive factors in the string of bank failures that we 
witnessed during the GFC. Beyond the impact of high debt on creditor (including banking 
counterparties) confidence, excessive leverage influences shareholder preferences and bank-
manager behaviour, giving rise to so-called leverage-agency costs. 131 
In general, there are three types of leverage: (1) “balance sheet,” (2) economic leverage, and (3) 
embedded, respectively based on balance-sheet concepts, market-dependent future cash flows, and 
market risk. 132 Balance-sheet leverage is the most recognized form, as it is the most visible. It 
measures the ratio by which the value of a firm’s assets exceeds its equity base. Banks typically 
leverage themselves by borrowing to acquire more assets, with the aim of increasing their return on 
equity. Economic leverage means that a bank is exposed to a change in the value of a position by an 
amount that exceeds what the bank paid for it. 133 Finally, embedded leverage refers to holding a 
position that is itself leveraged. 134 There is no single measure that can capture all three dimensions 
of leverage simultaneously. As a result, the EU Capital Requirements Regulation has provided a 
binding definition of what constitutes leverage, which firmly extends to balance-sheet and economic 
leverage, and catches embedded leverage only by implication and to the extent that measuring an 
institution’s embedded leverage is possible. 135 
Issues of definition and scope blighted earlier attempts to regulate banking via leverage ratios. The 
chief example was the US ratio, which totally failed to capture the perilous state of the US banks in 
the period before the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. The reason for that was that, 
prior to the GFC, the US required its banks to report on a simplified leverage ratio, based on banks’ 
Tier 1 capital ratio and their total on-balance-sheet risk-weighted assets (RWAs). 136 Banks engaging 
in a spate of asset substitution and securitizations could easily meet the Basel Risk-weighted 
requirements, while they remained perilously leveraged. The proven ineffectiveness of leverage 
ratios that focused on on-balance-sheet exposures and the perceived superiority of risk weights as a 
measure of bank exposures meant that the earlier debate on bank-leverage ratios was largely 
dismissive of their actual merits. 
c) The Question of Ratio Calibration 
 
There are many good reasons why common equity is regarded as a superior form of bank capital. 
Among the most important is the fact that equity is perpetual and thus irredeemably anchored to 
the solvency of the bank for the duration of its life as a going concern. In addition, it ranks last in the 
event of insolvency, and is capable of being used to absorb bank losses. Also, higher amounts of 
equity capital improve bank governance in two ways. First, higher levels of equity control 
shareholders’ preference to maximize risk and return by taking on more debt and curb their 
willingness to lend to risky projects. Thus, equity funding of bank assets lowers bank-governance 
costs. One of the most important questions surrounding capital regulation is how much bank capital 
is enough. An important factor that makes this question exceedingly complex is that banks, unlike 
other corporations, are not just allowed to use as “own funds” broader equity capital, including 
capital reserves and retained profit, but also serious amounts of convertible debt. A large number of 
commentators agree that bank capital should not just account for possible bank losses on some 
abstract weight-based ratios of asset riskiness, which is the fundamental rationale of Basel 
standards. It should also be a means to contain banking’s externalities and thus it should target 
those parts of the system that generate the highest amounts of risk either on their own or due to 
interconnectedness, accounting thus for the social cost (externalities) of bank failures. 
How much equity capital banks require is not an easy question to answer. Prima facie, there is a 
trade-off between business efficiency and bank safety. Yet the view that bank equity is more 
expensive than debt has strongly been disputed in a classic work by Admati et al. 137 Their view is 
corroborated by other studies (and by historical experience), which find that, due to the social costs 
involved in their operation, banks must hold much higher levels of capital than banks have held so 
far and higher than the Basel requirements. 138 Admati et al. (2011/revised 2013) suggest that a 
Tier 1 equity ratio of 20–30% over unweighted assets would be socially optimal. Miles et al. similarly 
argue for unweighted capital ratios of up to 20%. 139 Their argument for higher (equity) capital 
requirements is twofold: (1) to reduce the probability of a public bailout and thus reduce the 
exposure of taxpayers and (2) to reduce incentives for managers to take excessive risks (and play 
games with risk). In fact, they make a clear distinction between costs to individual institutions 
(private costs) and overall economic (or social) costs. They estimate the long-run costs and benefits 
of having banks fund more of their assets with loss-absorbing equity capital. The benefits are related 
to the reduction of the chance of banking crises, which generate substantial economic costs. The 
offset to any such benefits comes in the form of potentially higher costs of bank intermediation (e.g. 
higher lending rates or lower savings rates). They find that the amount of equity capital that is likely 
to be desirable for banks to use is very much larger than banks have used in recent years and also 
higher than targets agreed under the Basel III framework. 
Unsurprisingly, as the theoretical debate about an optimal ratio remains inconclusive, this pluralism 
is also reflected in recent measures across key G-20 jurisdictions aiming at the adoption of binding 
leverage by their banks. The Basel III Accord requires banks to have a minimum of 6% Tier 1 capital 
(comprising 4.5% common equity and retained earnings). In an attempt to counter the effects of 
inadequate disclosure of banks’ capital positions, the BCBS also requires, as a backstop, that banks 
operate with a minimum leverage ratio of 3%. 140 Any bank with an unweighted leverage ratio of 
less than 3% will be deemed to be undercapitalized, although full implementation will not be 
achieved until 2018. The distinction between the two measures is that leverage ratios strip out the 
effects of risk-weighting models, and the ratios are calculated using the tightened definition of 
capital required under Basel III. The ratio is designed to place a limit on the capacity of banks to 
leverage their capital base and to provide safeguards against possible RWA modelling error. 141 
3.3.2 A New Wave of Bank-Leverage Ratios 
 
Partly due to the extended implementation timescale of the Basel III ratios and partly due to the fact 
that the Basel III leverage ratio of 3% of non-weighted assets is arguably very low, important 
financial centres have drawn up their own plans for imposing a leverage ratio. Many have chosen to 
go substantially higher than the Basel III 3% ratio. 142 The Federal Reserve was required to establish 
the enhanced risk-based and leverage capital requirements for “covered companies,” namely bank 
holding companies with total consolidated assets of at least USD 50 billion and non-bank financial 
companies that the Financial Stability Oversight Council has designated for supervision by the FRB. 
143 Banks and other financial organizations are required to report to the market and regulators on 
their leverage ratio at regular intervals under the PCA regulations. Given the striking failure of the 
previous American leverage ratio to warn of impending disaster, mostly because off-balance-sheet 
exposures went unnoticed, the Dodd-Frank Act has adopted a more sophisticated approach to bank-
leverage measures. 
The leverage ratio itself for all banking organizations is set at 4%, 144 although certain large banking 
organizations are subject to a lower leverage ratio if they utilize the advanced internal ratings-based 
(IRB) approach to RWAs, which requires them to have a minimum total leverage exposure of 3%. 145 
However, a further supplementary rule has been introduced to cover the largest and most 
interconnected bank holding companies (BHCs), defined as those with more than USD 700 billion in 
consolidated total assets, or USD 10 trillion in assets under custody (covered BHCs). These banks 
would be required to maintain a Tier 1 capital leverage buffer of at least 2% above the minimum 
supplementary leverage ratio requirement of 3% (for banks which use the advanced IRB approach), 
for a total of 5%. Insured subsidiaries of BHCs (“Insured Depository Institutions”) must maintain at 
least a 6% supplementary leverage ratio to be considered “well capitalized” under the agencies’ PCA 
framework. 146 Failure to exceed the 5% ratio would subject covered BHCs to restrictions on 
discretionary bonus payments and capital distributions. This rule would currently apply to the eight 
largest and most interconnected US banks, although it will not be implemented in its entirety until 
January 2018. Furthermore, there are additional requirements for leverage restrictions in times of 
crisis. 147 
The Canadian “assets to capital multiple” is a rather comprehensive leverage ratio, because it also 
measures economic leverage (to some extent). It is applied at the level of the consolidated banking 
group by dividing an institution’s total adjusted consolidated assets—including some off-balance-
sheet items—by its consolidated (Tier 1 and 2) capital. Under this requirement, total adjusted assets 
should be no greater than 20 times the capital, although a lower multiple can be imposed on 
individual banks by the Canadian supervisory agency, the Office of the Superintendent of Financial 
Institutions (OSFI). This is more conservative than the previous US incarnation of the leverage ratio—
and the inclusion of off-balance-sheet items strengthens the ratio even more. Indeed, the stringency 
of Canada’s leverage ratio has been cited as one factor—along with sound supervision and 
regulation, good co-operation between regulatory agencies, strict capital requirements, and 
conservative lending practices—contributing to the strong performance of its financial sector during 
the financial crisis. 148 
In 2008, the Swiss regulator FINMA (Financial Market Supervisory Authority), in strengthening 
capital-adequacy requirements, introduced a minimum leverage ratio under Pillar 2 of Basel II 
(supervisory review) solely for the country’s two biggest banks: Credit Suisse and UBS. 149 The Swiss 
leverage ratio is based upon the Basel III definition of Tier 1 capital as a proportion of total adjusted 
assets and is set at a minimum of 3% at the consolidated level and 4% at the individual bank level. 
150 In fact, the Swiss government had considered raising the leverage ratio up to 10%—naturally 
attracting the wrath of the Swiss banking industry 151 —because it regarded the current 4% ratio as 
inadequate. 
The UK’s Bank of England has announced a new leverage ratio, which will be binding on all banks 
regulated by the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) by 2018. 152 This followed on from work 
done by the Independent Commission on Banking (chaired by Sir John Vickers), 153 which 
recommended that large UK ring-fenced banks ought to be subjected to a supplementary leverage 
ratio of approximately 4%. 154 Accordingly, the important UK banks may have to comply with a 
minimum total leverage ratio of 4.95%, although this would only occur if the maximum CCB had 
been activated under the Basel III system. It is perhaps noteworthy that, notwithstanding these 
increases in the leverage requirement, there has been widespread relief amongst the UK banking 
industry that tougher regulations were not imposed. 155 
4. THE LEVERAGE CYCLE, LEVERAGE RATIOS, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE PRC 
 
4.1 The Leverage Cycle—Nature and Consequences 
 
The dynamic feedback properties of leverage, volatility, and asset prices form the so-called leverage 
cycle. Market participants tend to behave in a pro-cyclical fashion and the capacity to leverage 
balance sheets permits them to engage in greater speculation on asset prices than unleveraged 
investors, if speculation is the principal motive behind their decision to borrow and their equity 
losses in the event of a gamble going badly are lower-than-expected payoffs. 156 The leverage cycle 
has been examined closely in recent years, especially in the post-2008 period. 157 One of the most 
worrying characteristics of the leverage cycle is that, while the risks it creates do seem Gaussian, 
they can also give rise to fat tails. This means that planning a protection scheme against such rises 
may not always be viewed as a priority, as associated risks will probably be seen as negligible. 
Moreover, as leverage is cyclical, so is the rise and fall of asset prices. 158 
The most important risk associated with leverage is the speed of deleveraging in a downturn. Thus, it 
may often prove difficult to prevent a “leverage cycle crash,” 159 which critically will lead to 
increased margin calls (so-called “margin calls spiral”) and probably to an evaporation of liquidity 
and a credit crunch. 160 While the credit cycle should not be confused with the so-called “leverage 
cycle,” 161 the signature of the leverage cycle is also rising asset prices in tandem with rising levels 
of indebtedness, followed later by falling asset prices and deleveraging. Accordingly, one of the most 
destabilizing effects of excessive leverage—for both individual financial institutions and the financial 
system as a whole—is that it causes or inflates asset bubbles, due to a feedback effect on asset 
prices. Intuitively, one would expect that, in a fair-value environment, a rise in asset prices would 
boost bank equity or net worth as a percentage of total assets. Stronger balance sheets would result 
in a lower leverage multiple. Conversely, in a downturn, asset prices and the net worth of the 
institution would fall and the leverage multiple would be likely to increase. 162 Contrary to intuition, 
however, empirical evidence has shown that bank-leverage rises during boom times and falls during 
downturns. Leverage tends to be pro-cyclical because the expansion and contraction of bank 
balance sheets amplify rather than contain the credit cycle. 
Leverage exacerbates the danger of contagion in the banking system and exacerbates the 
transmission of risks from the financial system to the real economy, for a number of reasons. First, in 
giving rise to credit and asset price cycles, excessive leverage contributes to macroeconomic booms 
and busts 163 —so-called asset bubbles 164 and crashes. 165 Driven as they are by flawed 
assumptions concerning fundamental value or by competitive pressures, bubbles have the potential 
to cause serious economic damage once they burst. It is clear that leverage increases in boom years 
when banks finance riskier loans and recedes during periods of economic contraction. 166 Thus, in 
periods of market booms, as asset markets typically become inflated, investors’ appetite for risk and 
speculation is amplified. Asset price growth at these higher rates, however, may be “incompatible 
with the potential for overall, real economic expansion.” 167 
Second, as already noted, leverage contributes to pro-cyclicality because of the compound effect 
that increased borrowing may have on asset prices. It follows that the negative effects of leverage 
are felt more keenly in times of general financial distress. 168 Investors are aware that the capital 
reserves of highly levered institutions will be wiped out in the event of negligible asset price falls. 
169 Thus, in a downturn, a bank with a highly levered balance sheet will suffer loss of confidence 
much earlier and faster than less-leveraged institutions. This leaves the financial system vulnerable 
to episodes of market panic, where asset price deflation and fire sales can quickly lead to mass 
insolvencies. 170 
Moreover, even where insolvency is not an immediate threat, potential regulatory initiatives asking 
highly levered banks to sell assets to bolster capital in the event of distress could inadvertently 
create problems for other financial institutions. The decision to sell assets is likely to lead to 
downward pressure on asset prices. The damage inflicted by deleveraging phases on both the 
financial system and the real economy is often significant 171 and, where borrowing levels have 
risen to unsustainable levels, it may lead to GDP reduction, negating the growth gains initially made 
due to high leverage. 
For many, the PRC’s economy is approaching the tipping point of the leverage cycle. 172 Namely, it 
is expected that either the economy will turn downwards, triggering a crisis of confidence, or the 
economy shall not be able to refinance earlier debts in order to keep boosting the leverage cycle, or 
both. As the credit channel, leverage levels, and asset prices seem to be interdependent, a dearth of 
credit or a run will trigger deleveraging (and possible firesales) with deleterious effects for both the 
stability of the financial system due to declining asset prices and the economy. Nonetheless, it is far 
from clear what triggers deleveraging—namely, whether a fall in asset prices comes first followed 
afterwards by a fall in levels of new debt or vice versa. 
Moreover, excessive leverage may just be a natural consequence of the combination of behavioural 
(over-confidence) factors and investment professionals’ perverse incentives (e.g. the higher the 
volume of credit-related transactions in the shadow as well as in the regulated sector, the bigger 
their compensation or the brighter their job prospects). During periods of economic prosperity and 
low loan defaults, banks’ capacity to create credit, coupled with inflated collateral values, increases 
banks’ capital reserves and removes constraints on further credit growth. 173 In addition, some 
financial assets become very popular amongst a certain class of buyers in relation to the rest of the 
public. 174 Buyers in this case are willing to pay higher prices, or tolerate increased risk. 175 This is 
often due to optimistic expectations concerning the future price trajectory of a given set of assets. 
Unsurprisingly, such pro-cyclicality contributes to higher risk-taking by banks 176 and influences 
bank managers’ behaviour, 177 especially where an important component of the compensation 
package is variable. 178 Thus, it is right to argue that front-stop leverage ratios stabilize financial 
institutions and the financial system as a whole, 179 but it is unknown whether they also dampen 
the leverage cycle, especially without the aid of the monetary tool. 180 
4.2 Drivers of Bank Leverage in General and in the PRC 
 
A debt-financed corporation is, in principle, as efficiently funded as an equity-financed one. 181 But, 
in reality, bank-capital structures are a function of the relative costs of capital. 182 Invariably, the 
costs of raising equity capital exceed those in relation to raising debt finance, as equity capital is 
perceived to be riskier than debt. 183 In addition, debt finance enjoys a more favourable tax 
treatment, as interest payments are deducted from tax liabilities whereas dividends are taxed as 
income. In the absence of a bail-in risk, or when depositors and senior debt holders are exempted 
from bail-in, bank creditors are exposed to a much lower level of risk than the aggregate risk level of 
the entire pool of bank assets, and thereby receive much lower returns. In contrast, bank-equity 
holders are exposed to much greater risks and therefore receive higher returns on investment. 
Increased equity requirements will therefore, in general, increase the costs of capital. 184 So the 
first driver of bank leverage relates to relative costs of financing balance-sheet expansion and that is 
regardless of the documented too-big-to-fail subsidy that may diminish with the influx of bail-in 
regimes. 185 
While the cost of funding is a fundamental factor behind bank-leverage levels, this cost is not merely 
a matter of preferential tax treatment. Debt-cost advantages also relate to macroeconomic 
conditions prevalent at particular points in the business cycle. If the costs of borrowing are artificially 
low, due to prevailing national and global conditions of excessive liquidity, extensively insured 
deposits, or because of quantitative easing, this will result in severe distortions in bank-funding 
preferences, even in the absence of tax subsidies. 186 In addition, banks focusing on return on 
equity (RoE) will feel obliged to exploit this underpricing of risk to leverage and expand their balance 
sheet to increase profitability. 187 
Shareholder-dominated banks will, in the absence of leverage constraints, pile up leverage: 
shareholders have a clear conflict of interests when choosing a bank’s capital structure and they 
normally prefer to finance balance-sheet expansion through debt. 188 Admati et al. have vividly 
explained the reasons for shareholders’ persistent preference for high leverage, 189 which goes 
beyond the common assumption of shareholder moral hazard due to the protection they are 
afforded by limited liability. While premature debt redemption in good times favours creditors, as 
the bank will become safer and less likely to fail in bad times, lowering creditor risks, bondholders 
will inevitably ask to hand in their bonds to be redeemed for a price higher than the prevailing 
market price. Thus, early redemption will eat into bank profits, leaving shareholders worse off 
without any clear compensating benefit on the share price that might even decline as lower leverage 
clearly points to lower levels of future profitability. This makes the upfront cost of early debt 
redemption undesirable to shareholders. 
Shareholder preference for high leverage has a “ratchet effect” whereby worthy projects are ignored 
by an over-leveraged bank in favour of lower-quality loans. 190 It follows that, in the absence of 
controls on leverage, all that is required, even in the case of benign senior managers, was to imitate 
competitor business strategies and herd. In the case of PRC banks where the interests of the 
majority shareholder (the state) are represented by the agents (directors and senior management), 
this effect is even more accentuated and means only one thing, as we saw in Section 3 above—
namely, ever higher involvement with speculative activity in the shadow sector to boost profit and 
ever more lending to SOEs. 
At the same time, bank management can use asset substitution, a very frequent practice in PRC 
banking, as we have already seen, to shift risks—a process made much easier through leverage, 191 
especially where capital regulations allow/foster this process. The possibility of regulatory arbitrage 
may mean that banks select asset portfolios with higher risk in order to maximize return on capital. 
192 Risk-weighting of assets in bank portfolios ought to mitigate these effects somewhat, assuming 
that risk weights were accurate, 193 in the absence of asset substitution. But it is clear from the 
foregone discussion that PRC banks push many risks off the balance sheet and actively manage risk 
weights. 194 
Naturally, as bad credits accumulate, the impact on the PRC economy will become ever more 
accentuated. We show below how strongly upwards is the debt dynamic in the PRC corporate 
sector. 
Apart from an adverse impact on financial stability, the most significant drawback of excessive 
leverage is so-called “debt overhang,” which reduces the efficiency of bank lending. It prevents firms 
from borrowing (and banks from lending) money to finance investment, even where that investment 
is guaranteed to produce a return, because of the earlier excessive borrowing and resulting fragile 
capital structures. Firms with large debt-equity ratios will therefore pass up valuable investment 
opportunities, even where those opportunities would lead to an increase of the firm’s net value. 
Where bank capital falls (e.g. due to asset repricing), it will prove extremely difficult for a bank to 
escape debt overhang and worthwhile investments will be sacrificed in favour of asset sales and 
deleveraging. 
In these circumstances, if regulators require a replenishment of the bank’s capital base, the bank will 
be unable, or unwilling, to extend credit to worthwhile borrowers. This, by implication, reduces the 
overall volume of funding available to finance projects and creates inefficiencies in the allocation of 
funds. Thus, highly levered banks eventually make less efficient investment decisions, 195 resulting 
in both underinvestment due to the debt overhang 196 and misallocation of resources. Accordingly, 
overborrowing (and investment) during boom times is followed by a serious halt on new investment 
during a downturn, triggering a liquidity asphyxia and of course a sharp correction/fall in asset 
prices. 197 Both developments tend to have chain effects on economic activity and employment 
rates as well as on savings ratios. 
In the case of China, where the steel and mining industries are not just among the most over-
indebted, but also those posting the highest levels of NPLs, debt overhang would mean valuable 
resources trapped in unproductive industries whose time might have come not only due to levels of 
global competition, but also because such industries are among the biggest polluters. That is, 
resources required to build a modern and greener economy would be trapped with factories that 
simply have no future and have become an overall burden/inefficiency tax on the PRC economy and 
society. 
4.3 Risk-Weighted Capital Ratios or Unweighted Leverage Ratios 
 
Well-calibrated bank-capital requirements should be able to both prevent banks from assuming 
excessive risk and compel banks to build sufficient capital cushions to absorb losses. Yet this is not 
what our recent experience says. At the heart of the GFC were severely undercapitalized banks. The 
main mechanism through which additional leverage became embedded within the financial system 
involved asset substitution by banks to circumvent capital requirements. This process led to capital-
structure reporting that was misleading. Whilst asset levels increased markedly in the years leading 
up to the GFC, reported leverage levels at large commercial banks were remarkably constant. 198 
This would normally suggest that, whilst banks expanded asset levels aggressively, they also 
managed to maintain stable regulatory capital levels and leverage ratios. Of course, official data did 
not provide the full picture. Leverage increases were caused by poorly calibrated internal financial 
models, 199 the abysmal performance of credit-rating agencies, 200 and fraud. 201 Moreover, there 
is strong evidence that reported leverage levels at both commercial and investment banks were 
manipulated, or were inaccurate, due to exploitation of applicable rules on bank capital by senior 
bank management. 202 
Much risk-weight optimization (RWO) was achieved through employment of securitization models, 
as it was assumed that, by diversifying and spreading risk throughout the financial system through 
securitization, the financial system would be more stable and more resilient to shocks. 203 However, 
most of the risk remained in the banking system, as some of the most active purchasers of 
structured financial products were banks themselves. 204 In the period leading up to the GFC, RWO 
was practised by all banks which funded a large amount of their assets with short-term liabilities 205 
through the use of conduits and off-balance-sheet vehicles. 206 These conduits raised funds by 
selling short-term asset-backed commercial paper, with the assets concerned usually comprising 
mortgage pools and secured loans. 207 Because these conduits funded themselves with short-term 
debt, any loss of confidence or liquidity pressures due to a reduction in buyers of commercial paper 
would quickly destroy their viability, indirectly exposing the sponsor bank to funding-liquidity risk. To 
offset this risk, banks granted credit facilities and guarantees to their conduits; however, sponsor 
banks remained liable for any losses arising from the conduit. 
These risks were attenuated by the increasing maturity mismatch on the balance sheets of 
investment banks, which funded many of their operations through repurchase agreements 
(“repos”). According to estimates, investment-bank repo financing doubled between 2000 and 2007 
and, in this way, it exposed the investment banks to potential liquidity shortfalls, if repo financing 
became compromised. 208 Large banks also enjoyed privileged access to these supplies of short-
term debt over and above their access to depositor finance, so they were presumed to be safe in the 
event of a liquidity crisis. In practice, very few large banks were able to raise funds to bolster their 
capital once the GFC unfolded. In 2007, the short-term-debt market collapsed, 209 ruining the 
solvency of many institutions, which were found to be severely undercapitalized. 210 
Today, a similar scenario of migration of funding and solvency risks to the regulated sector of the 
PRC may not be ruled out—quite the contrary, as explained in Section 2 above. In addition, 
benefiting from the manipulation of capital regulations, PRC banks switched away from loans into 
structured financial products, which attract lower capital charges; it is a clear and present danger, 
and the Basel system of risk weights has made things worse in a market where off-balance-sheet 
arbitrage opportunities are plentiful due to formal restrictions on bank lending and interest-rate 
caps. 
The Basel system of risk weights has also been criticized as being excessively complex and highly 
difficult to understand, rendering it ineffective as a source of market discipline, also given its 
susceptibility to gaming. In fact, investors have reported losses of confidence in the risk-weighting 
system 211 and in the capacity of banks to calculate their levels of RWAs, even amongst specific 
asset classes. 212 Reported wide discrepancies in British banks’ capital ratios when non-weighted 
assets are measured against own funds provide enough evidence to make any confident investor in 
the banking sector and prudent bank regulator lose sleep. 213 This uncertainty severely undermines 
rather than reinforces market discipline. 
Second, there is remarkable inconsistency in the way bank models measure RWA risk. The best 
recent example is the more favourable rating that credit-rating agencies give to derivatives 
exposures of banks over bank debt, due to the preferential treatment of derivatives contracts under 
the EU and, to some extent, the US resolution regimes. To this effect, research by the BCBS confirms 
considerable variation across banks in the reporting of risk-based measurement of assets. 214 For 
instance, there is a considerable degree of variation in, inter alia, the market-risk-measurement 
methodologies employed by global banks, banks’ modelling choices, on the basis of the Basel II 
Internal Ratings methodology (retained by Basel III), and accounting requirements and practices. 215 
Most of these variations may be explained by the fact that banks are able to “use whatever models 
they like, provided supervisors sign off on basic rules of their use. The same [product] therefore may 
be priced differently in two different banks.” 216 In the event of a crisis, all this hardwired 
uncertainty as to the true state of bank-capital reserves will lead to a near certain loss of confidence 
in the banking system 217 and, at the very least, to an investor flight from bank shares, as happened 
during the GFC. 218 
Third, there is a growing body of empirical evidence that suggests that RWAs are not a significant 
indicator of the possibility of bank default. As mentioned earlier, in the simplest form of gaming the 
rules, banks turned high-risk credits into highly rated structured securities eliminating capital 
requirements, although they extended credit lines to requisite securitization vehicles, which 
attracted no capital charges. Yet, provision of liquidity facilities to these vehicles exposed them to 
appreciable risks in the event of disruption of payments to the special-purpose vehicle (SPV) by the 
original borrowers, such as due to a disruption in borrower households’ income. Moreover, they 
held structured credit instruments on their own balance sheet, exposing themselves to embedded 
leverage and increasing their asset-liability mismatch and their funding-liquidity risk. 
The OECD has found that Basel Tier 1 capital levels were not a statistically significant predictor of 
default risk. When analyzed on the basis of unweighted leverage ratios, however, a significant 
statistical link was present. 219 As noted by the authors of the study, a simple leverage ratio is a 
much better predictor of default risk than RWA measures, which are invariably subjected to RWO. 
220 In the same mode, Andy Haldane of the Bank of England has put together a persuasive set of 
tables showing that leverage has been a better predictor of bank survival than capital. 221 
Here, it should be noted that, as already mentioned, while the US had a leverage ratio as a 
prudential tool, it failed to give any warning signs; as a result, US banks were at the centre of the 
GFC. Nonetheless, in this case, it was the ratio’s inability to catch off-balance-sheet exposures in a 
period that US banks were massively engaged in off-balance-sheet activity. As a result, the leverage 
ratio did not produce any warning signs. This means that the way the leverage ratio is calculated and 
how off-balance-sheet exposures are accounted as part of bank assets is a process as important as 
identifying the right ratio. 
5. MIXING EVOLUTIONARY AND “BIG BANG” REFORMS TO RESOLVE THE PRC’S FINANCIAL-STABILITY 
CHALLENGES 
 
5.1 PRC Reform Effort to Tame Financial-Stability Risks 
 
5.1.1 Overview 
 
There is a widespread impression in the Western press that the PRC government either does not try 
or does not wish to radically tackle NPLs and diminish the financial-stability risks emanating from the 
shadow sector. Both views are wrong. 222 The truth is much more complex. The PRC authorities 
have adopted a multitude of measures to tackle the financial-stability risks. A first wave of reform 
seems to have taken place between 1998 and 2005. But then, between 2006 and 2013, the pace of 
reform stalled. 223 It picked up again when, on 25 March 2013, the CBRC promulgated regulation on 
the use of wealth-management funds by PRC banks in order to strengthen risk management. 224 It 
requires commercial banks to match each wealth-management product with invested assets 
(underlying assets), and to set separate management, account, and book-keeping for each product, 
as well as a percentage limit on non-standardized credit assets in total underlying assets. Under 
Notice No. 8, commercial banks are required to match each wealth-management product with 
invested assets (underlying assets), and to set separate management, account, and book-keeping for 
each product, as well as a percentage limit on non-standardized credit assets in total underlying 
assets. 
As regards the shadow-banking system, the CBRC has already implemented the following concrete 
measures: (1) banks are prohibited from providing guarantees or repurchase undertakings for the 
assets underlying the trust schemes; (2) trust companies have been subjected to capital 
requirements to ensure that their capital is compatible with the assets held under their trust 
schemes; (3) a 30% cap has been imposed on trust companies allocating assets under a bank-trust 
co-operation arrangement referring credit assets (loans and bonds); (4) all assets held by a bank 
through a bank-trust co-operation arrangement must be reflected in the bank’s balance sheet and 
therefore become subject to capital-adequacy requirements. 225 
The CBRC promulgated the Regulation Governing Capital of Commercial Banks on 7 June 2012 and 
has moved to establish a living-wills (recovery and resolution plans) template for the largest 
institutions. Both measures mark a milestone for the regulation of the banking sector in China. As 
reported by the CBRC at the end of December 2013, the weighted average core Tier 1 capital-
adequacy ratio of commercial banks (foreign branches not included) was 9.95%, increased by 0.14% 
year on year; and the weighted average capital-adequacy ratio was 12.19%, falling by 0.29% year on 
year. Moreover, in accordance with the Private Bank Guidelines, each wholly privately owned bank 
must have in place a “living will” for itself. 
In addition, from July to October of 2013, a series of new policies in respect of cross-border RMB 
settlement were released by PBOC, including but not limited to the Notice of Simplifying the Cross-
Border RMB Business Process and Improving the Relevant Policies and the Notice of Relevant RMB 
Settlement Matters for Overseas Investors to Invest in Domestic Financial Institutions. On 15 June 
2015, the CBRC published the Amended Implementation Measures on Licensing Chinese-funded 
Commercial Banks, which were designed to further narrow the scope of licensing required for 
banking businesses, decentralize the power of the approval authority, and simplify the licensing 
procedures. This is regarded as a positive measure to invite private capital into the financial sector. 
The CBRC Guidelines on Corporate Governance of Commercial Banks (hereinafter the Corporate 
Governance Guidelines) of 19 July 2013 require a sound organization structure, clear-cut 
responsibility boundaries, proper development strategy, good value criteria and social responsibility, 
effective risk management and internal control, an appropriate incentive, and disciplinary 
mechanism. Specifically, the Guidelines provide that the board of directors is accountable to 
shareholders and is ultimately responsible for the operation and management of a commercial bank. 
Thus, board members are required to have specific expertise and qualifications, and are subject to a 
remuneration structure that incentivizes proper risk management. 226 Moreover, the CBRC 
Guidelines place increased attention on internal controls within commercial banks, including 
effective risk assessment and effective procedures to safeguard assets and enable the bank to 
comply with applicable law. Commercial banks are required to establish independent risk-
management departments, which shall be vested with sufficient power, resources, and a direct 
channel of communication with the Board. 
Given that the discussed increase in levels of systemic risk is, in part, a by-product of the post-2008 
loosening of credit standards to tackle the GFC, including a large expansion in credit that led to a 
worsening of average credit quality, the tightening of prudential regulations to force banks to build 
up reserves through higher provisioning for NPLs is a rather positive step. The same is the case with 
the adoption of more stringent capital-adequacy standards, placing limits on bank guarantees for 
corporate bonds, and tightening liquidity and diversification ratios. Banks have also been strongly 
encouraged to raise new capital. 
To this effect, perhaps the most potent of this new wave of financial regulations is the promulgation 
of the Deposit Insurance Regulations. Under the Regulations, each bank shall maintain insurance 
coverage for money deposited with it and each depositor would be compensated for loss up to RMB 
500,000 in the case that the accepting bank becomes insolvent or goes bankrupt. The Deposit 
Insurance Regulations came into force on 1 May 2015. 227 
An even more potent example in the developing template for tackling and monitoring systemic risk 
is the macroprudential management framework (discussed in Section 2.2). The systemic-risk-
monitoring framework includes the PBOC and the three regulatory agencies (CBRC, CSRC, CIRC) and 
consists of three layers: FCRG meetings to discuss and make decisions inter alia on financial-stability 
issues; risk surveillance, analysis, and prevention policies by individual agencies; and co-operation 
among them to arrive at an overall risk assessment. 
5.1.2 Critique 
 
Given this flurry of regulatory reform, the first question that may be asked here is why then the 
overall picture for financial-stability risks in the PRC has not markedly improved. A convincing 
explanation in this context may only be given by reference to fundamentals and these are the pace 
of innovation and the structure of financial regulation. Clearly, PRC authorities were caught 
unprepared to tackle the massive wave of innovation that marred the shifting economic paradigm, 
including the advent of electronic service providers and Internet-based businesses, and its spillover 
to a financial system that suffered the consequences of repression for at least two decades. The 
pace of the resulting transformation of the business paradigm and financial system structures and 
modes of service delivery and savings management has pushed regulators to the back-pedal, forcing 
them to engage reactively rather than proactively with emerging risks. Namely, unlike NPLs, where 
political pressure and policy preferences have historically played a large role in their accumulation, 
shadow banking developed at such a pace, with implicit bank guarantees probably playing a role for 
such acceleration, that the PRC regulators were left far behind. 
Second, the silo approach to regulation and lack of clear lines of responsibility for financial stability 
prevent effective implementation of prescribed rules. On the contrary, they leave the gate open for 
restrictions to be continually circumscribed and that is not just as a result of a chase for yield, but 
also and very clearly due to the funding needs of certain economic sectors. Specifically, the FSB has 
identified several weaknesses to the financial stability, including to the following 228 : 
A limited macroprudential toolkit (dynamic differentiated reserve requirements and window 
guidance) is rather limited. To this effect, as financial liberalization progresses further, the FSB raises 
the prospect of the PBOC turning into a frontline macroprudential regulator to fulfil its system-wide 
financial-stability mandate “by adapting its own tools and having a greater say in the application of 
other tools.” 
The sector-specific perspective of different regulatory agencies presents a considerable challenge to 
the overall calibration of macroprudential policy, “particularly as some measures may (for example) 
seek to loosen credit for countercyclical purposes while others seek to curb the growth in non-bank 
credit intermediation.” 229 
Information-sharing among regulators—the increased blurring of product lines across the financial 
industry with the concomitant potential for increased regulatory arbitrage underscores the need for 
enhanced information-sharing across agencies but, right now, the sharing of key information (e.g. 
results of stress tests and on-site inspections) is either restricted or shared if requested. 
Communication—the FSB notes that co-ordinating bodies like the FCRG and JMC do not have a 
separate communication policy and little information is publicly available on their deliberations. 
While there are good reasons to keep certain information confidential, on the other hand, public 
communication by these bodies can be a form of “soft” intervention 230 and also could form an 
important part of their accountability framework. 
Absence of clear policy framework on which market participants’ expectations about the policy 
could be anchored, intensifying occasional turbulence caused by policy uncertainty. 
5.2 Proposals for Reform 
 
5.2.1 A New Regulatory Architecture 
 
To remedy this piecemeal approach to systemic regulation and address the financial-stability 
challenges that the PRC currently faces, we suggest a four-pronged reform that is informed by the 
contemporary reform debate in China and the findings of impartial observers such as the FSB and 
IMF, and incorporates international reform experience (discussed in Section 3.1). 
a) Abolition of Lending Restrictions and Introduction of a Binding Leverage Ratio 
 
As a first step, we recommend the abolition of the least useful restrictions on lending such as loan-
to-deposit ratios and the phasing-out of interest-rate caps on deposits within the same transitional 
period that would be set for the adoption of a binding all-encompassing leverage ratio. The latter 
would catch off-balance-sheet exposures and will reveal the volume and size of such exposures, 
controlling, thus, to some extent interconnectedness between the regulated and shadow sector, and 
augmenting at the same time lending standards. 
On the basis of historical experience and the discussion in Section 3.2 on the optimal calibration of a 
leverage ratio, we suggest that the new leverage ratio should be set at 7% over unweighted assets, 
which is roughly equivalent to 17.5% RWA. The ratio would act as the key capital-adequacy rule, 
pushing RWA capital standards to a subsidiary role. A transitional period of three to four years would 
be essential to give banks sufficient time to raise additional private capital. The leverage ratio could 
be relaxed if credit-supply contracts while the economy has entered into a recessionary phase 
moving down to 6% (roughly 15% RWA)—a decision that would have to be taken by the suggested 
below macroprudential council with the agreement of the microprudential regulator; or it could be 
raised at the peak of the macroeconomic cycle to reach 8% (roughly 20%). The 15–20% RWA 
(lower/upper limit) is less than the 23% RWA that an authoritative recent US regulatory report 
recommends. 231 
Stripping debt finance of tax incentives makes bank-equity funding as cost-effective as debt. This 
reform and the recommended abolition of lending restrictions would mean that leverage ratios 
might not make for a reduction in overall levels of credit funding, especially long-term funding. Any 
funding shortfalls emanating from the introduction of the suggested leverage ratio and its expected 
indirect impact on shadow funding—which may not be substantial, as PRC banks do not direct a 
substantial part of their lending to SMEs and a substantial part of shadow-banking turnover is 
recycling money for the purpose of arbitrage rather than credit investment—could be replaced by 
risk-equity capital. 
Only Tier 1 capital, namely equity and near-equity instruments, would be included in the definition 
of capital. This reform would both raise the quality of bank-capital loss absorption and bank 
governance as, in the event of a bank failure, the losses of shareholders in the gradually privatized 
banks will be substantial. In this respect, this measure would differ from the existing leverage ratio 
of 4%, since the latter is little more than a mere reporting tool for now. 232 
For the leverage ratio to work properly, hidden contractual or statutory exposures of banks to the 
shadow sector will have to be more clearly defined and disclosed, at least to the regulators. The 
recent modification of the Macro Prudential Assessment risk tool by the PBOC to require banks to 
report all their off-balance-sheet exposures as much as those that are on the balance sheet 233 with 
a view of setting aside more capital would only help the implementation of the suggested leverage 
ratio. 
b) A Binding and Effective Regime for Early Intervention 
 
To aid the effectiveness of the suggested shift in the calculation and use of bank capital, as well as 
for the timely tackling and provisioning of NPLs, we recommend the introduction of an explicit and 
binding framework for early intervention 234 —namely, a regime that will deal with banks that are 
entering into trouble but are still a going-concern institution and a viable business. To ensure the 
impartial application of the early-intervention regime that would aim to restore the ailing bank’s 
capital and liquidity position relying, to some extent, on the pre-agreed actions included in the 
banks’ “living wills,” we suggest that a formal/binding early-intervention regime should be 
administered by both the suggested below microprudential regulator and the resolution authority 
with the explicit participation (with a casting vote) of the PBOC in the guise of the LoLR. The regime 
will also offer guidance as to when a bank is considered viable and the conditions under which LoLR 
assistance may be extended, curbing but not diminishing the PBOC’s discretion. 
c) Abolition of the Silo Approach: Microprudential Regulator, Conduct and Consumer-Protection 
Watchdog, Resolution Authority, Macroprudential Council 
 
As a third step, we recommend the abolition of the silo approach in favour of an objectives-based 
approach to regulation. A suggestion that is so radical is, of course, bound to attract the wrath of 
existing regulatory agencies and interest groups supporting them. In this context, we track closely 
the post-crisis reform of the UK’s financial architecture while also borrowing from the post-2008 
regulatory configuration in the US. Implementation of our proposal would entail merging the CBRC 
and the CIRC into a single microprudential authority in the mould of the UK’s PRA. This will be solely 
responsible for institution licensing and prudential stability across the regulated financial sector, 
with no silos between banks and investment and insurance firms. Then, we suggest that a resolution 
authority that may be the deposit-insurance scheme, as is the case with the FDIC in the US, or a 
resolution authority acting as a division of the PBOC should have a say in microprudential regulation, 
especially in the context of an early-intervention regime. 
As part of the same reform step, we suggest turning the CSRC into a conduct and consumer-
protection authority. Namely, in a twin-peaks-plus structure, we envisage a conduct regulator that 
would act as an expanded version of the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). This regulator 
would be responsible for investor protection, supervising conduct risk across the regulated sector—
that is, with no silos between the banking, securities, and insurance sectors—and would monitor 
against market abuse. It would also enforce securities-law violations. Even more critically, the same 
regulator should be a financial consumer-protection authority for all firms, monitoring all firms that 
offer consumer investment products, whether banks, shadow banks, or other licensed brokers. As 
this authority would enforce consumer-protection regulation, there would be a requirement for 
shadow operators to register with it. 
Within the same third reform step, the last action would be the establishment of a macroprudential 
authority in the form of a high-level financial-stability council within the PBOC (comprising the PBOC 
governor and deputy governor, the minister to the treasury, and the heads of the microprudential 
and conduct authorities as well as the head of the resolution-authority/deposit-guarantee scheme). 
The macroprudential council will have paramount access to all aspects of financial-stability data, 
including about emerging risks and exposure levels in the shadow sector. To make the processing of 
such information easier, the macroprudential council will not just have access to the data of the 
microprudential and conduct regulator. The PBOC should open and operate for the benefit of the 
council a register where all claims and counterclaims in the shadow sector would be reported. The 
register, in its architecture, would not be very different to the trade-reporting systems used for 
transactions in derivatives. Reporting data to the PBOC register would not entail licensing of 
shadow-banking operators. But lack of such reporting or irregular reporting would mean that the 
operator of a FinTech platform, a licensed institution, or a shadow vehicle would be subject to 
sanctions imposed by the conduct regulator for breach of data-reporting regulations. Contemporary 
data-mining tools could make such a register much more useful than would have been the case in 
the past and an essential tool for the detection of emerging risks and above all for mapping 
interconnectedness. 
The suggested macroprudential council should not be merely fashioned in the mould of the Financial 
Policy Committee of the Bank of England or of the US Financial Stability Oversight Council (both 
discussed in Section 3.1 above); it ought to be equipped with its own toolkit and powers of 
imposition of its rules/guidance. These direct powers could be exercised as a last resort to avoid 
forbearance on behalf of the microprudential supervisor. In addition, the macroprudential 
committee would issue its own communications and guidance to resolve the aforementioned policy 
direction and market-guidance inadequacies identified by the FSB (discussed above). 
d) Reform of Legal and Tax Regimes Governing Equity Investment 
 
This fourth step is essential in order to foster equity investment, especially risk capital investment 
provided by venture capital and private equity firms. Any funding shortfalls for meritorious projects 
emanating from the import of the suggested leverage ratio and its indirect impact on shadow-
banking credit financing could be replaced by risk-equity capital. Moreover, it is a fiscal-policy reform 
that is increasingly regarded as essential to secure systemic stability and a robust macroprudential 
environment. 235 
5.2.2 Evaluation of the Proposed Capital Reforms and the Question of Adverse Selection 
 
This paper has explained why properly calibrated leverage ratios may prevent wasteful use of capital 
and make financial institutions more resilient. They control asset substitution and risk shifting. 
Essentially, banks have to increase the size of their capital cushions, no matter the risk-weighting of 
the relevant exposures and in proportion to the net increase in value of the bank assets. An 
unweighted and all-encompassing leverage ratio is simple to apply and monitor, and eliminates 
regulatory arbitrage, namely the bank’s ability to engage in RWA and the more particular forms of 
regulatory arbitrage in the PRC to avoid the already discussed lending and interest-rate restrictions. 
It would thus restore confidence in the financial health indicators of Chinese banks, putting a stop to 
frequent runs on their shares. 
It is also argued that a binding and all-encompassing leverage ratio will sharply reverse incentives 
when it comes to bank lending, rather than the current ex post requirements, which, in an 
environment of lending biases and limited accountability for bank management, might lead to 
adverse selection that is discussed below. PRC banks became subjected to wide leverage ratios from 
2013, with further overhauling of the ratio without raising capital requirements in 2015. So they are 
already able to meet higher leverage ratios 236 but, even if they were not able to do so, raising 
private equity funding can only increase private-sector investment in PRC banks, 237 the quality of 
risk management, and governance of PRC banks, which are both state-dominated and state-
manager-dominated, leading to severe lending biases. It will also provide a very strong incentive to 
bank leadership to appoint and promote executives from the ranks of private-sector professionals 
with strong backgrounds in credit-risk management. In addition, it will provide a check on smaller 
banks’ risk on management procedures, which seem to be not much different than the loose 
processes followed by shadow banks in an alleged race to the bottom. 238 
Arguably, the proposed boosting of bank-capital structures and funding sources will incentivize: (1) 
shareholder controls, as it would be their equity that would be at stake if a loan becomes an NPL and 
not just creditors’ (depositors’ and bondholders’) money; (2) the shoring-up of management 
accountability for lending standards; (3) the implementation of sound risk-management procedures; 
and (4) the tightening-up of bank governance. These changes will augment and speed up 
implementation of declared regulatory objectives in the PRC banking sector, like those included in 
the aforementioned CBRC Corporate Governance Guidelines. 
We have already explained (in Section 4) that empirical research on the implementation of leverage 
ratios, which entail higher equity buffers for banks, has not shown them to have an appreciable 
adverse impact on economic growth. There is no reason to believe that the results would be 
substantially different in the PRC, especially if any shortfall in funding due to higher bank-capital 
constraints is made up by an increase in risk-equity capital and other forms of equity funding. So the 
final major question that any cost–benefit analysis of the proposed introduction of a leverage ratio 
has to answer is the issue of adverse selection. 
It is argued that higher leverage restrictions do not always reduce risk for the bank. Even if the risk of 
individual assets remains constant, bank managers may be incentivized into choosing assets with 
more highly correlated returns. 239 Accordingly, as this argument goes, leverage ratios may 
encourage banks to increase the riskiness of their asset portfolio, not decrease it—a classic 
Goodhart’s Law outcome. This concern was precisely the rationale for seeking risk-sensitivity in the 
Basel framework in the first place. 240 In many ways, reluctance to regulate leverage stemmed from 
a fear that it would affect economic growth without making banks safer, since banks would evade 
the “crippling”-profit consequence of a strict leverage ratio by focusing on high-return projects, 
which are riskier in most cases. Namely, as this argument goes, leverage ratios are bound to create 
perverse incentives. 241 
The fact that leverage ratios do not distinguish between different types of bank assets on the basis 
of their riskiness could mean that banks felt encouraged to build up relatively riskier balance sheets 
or to expand their off-balance-sheet activity. 242 In addition, the lack of risk-weighting in the 
calculation of leverage ratios could penalize prudent banks holding substantial portfolios of highly 
liquid, high-quality assets. Accordingly, as this argument goes, because leverage amplifies gains from 
both risky and riskless investments, riskier assets generate higher returns, and RoE targets 
incentivize asset risk. 243 Research on bank performance during the GFC strongly suggests that asset 
write-downs were positively and significantly related to asset volatility and leverage. 244 
Yet adverse selection does not seem likely, if PRC regulation of loan securitizations and issuance of 
asset-backed bonds are tightened. Securitizations can be a key form of loan refinancing; banks will 
strive to put on their books better loans, not worse, in order to be able to sell them. Second, if banks 
are forced by means of capital-adequacy regulation to keep “skin in the game” (e.g. a co-investment 
stake in the pool of varied size), their lending will be less reckless, even if they plan to slice and 
securitize the loans, since some exposure to the pool of underlying assets shall remain. Thus, good 
lending could be carried on, while underwriting standards are enhanced. 
Finally, another argument against the possibility of adverse selection is that a binding leverage ratio 
will shift the attention of supervisors from dealing with ex post outcomes of bad lending to 
monitoring closely the behaviour of the ratio and thus increasing the chances of successful early 
intervention and preventive action when the signals turn negative. It also incorporates market 
discipline. Leverage ratios may remedy weaknesses of creditor monitoring of banks in the face of 
complexity and opacity of bank balance sheets, as a bank that will need to boost its capital buffers to 
meet the ratio would have to be profitable and/or of good repute so that it could do so (meeting the 
ratio) through the sale of quality assets, retained profit, or from the market. 
6. CONCLUSION 
 The key characteristics of the emerging economic and financial paradigm in the PRC points towards a 
dynamic economy that is gradually shifting focus away from manufacturing, which merely required 
provision of bulk lending to SOEs, towards innovation and technology championed by smaller firms. 
Clearly, the PRC needs a financial system that is fit for the purpose of financing the new economic 
paradigm. The biggest obstacle to achieving this goal is the fact that the financial system has become 
much more fragile due to rising leverage levels, under-performing or non-performing legacy assets 
(MPLs), and interconnectedness with the sprawling shadow sector. The latter is in part fed by rent-
seeking, and regulatory and interest-rate arbitrage while it also serves, in part, as the provider of 
innovative financing. 
This article has attempted to answer the question on how the PRC’s rising financial-stability 
challenges could be met. For this reason, we have focused on the role of PRC banks in this 
environment of mounting financial-stability challenges rather than just examining its ever-expanding 
shadow sector in isolation. We propose that financial-stability reforms in the PRC should encompass 
a radical reconfiguration of the Chinese regulatory system to augment and streamline financial-
stability monitoring, microprudential supervision, and consumer protection. Our proposal is more 
radical than the mere introduction of a financial-stability council in the PRC and requires the radical 
restructuring of existing PRC financial regulators. We have also focused on the importance of the 
bank-governance environment, early intervention, and crisis management as a means to contain the 
recurrent problem of bad lending and NPLs. 
PRC shadow banking is bank-centric rather than a system sourcing finance through the (short-term) 
capital markets. It is boosted by implicit guarantees rather than financial engineering and it is heavily 
reliant on retail funding, although it is not entirely parasitic. We have, thus, argued that the PRC’s 
shadow-banking system should be conceived as a more or less parallel banking system that short-
circuits the regulated sector. For this reason, in our view, the orderly operation of the PRC shadow-
banking sector requires the improvement of the regulation of banks and a wider paradigm shift in 
the economy towards equity funding with a proliferation of risk-equity capital schemes moving away 
from the current model of funding for economic activity that is overwhelmingly debt-driven. 
This multi-track reform is necessary to both increase the resilience of banks and battle the effects of 
interconnectedness. As things stand, it is, ultimately, the regulated sector that will have to absorb 
any financial-stability shocks. Therefore, to address the financial stability challenges facing the PRC 
financial system, we recommend higher levels of capital as a first-line defence. In this context, we 
suggest the introduction of a binding and all-encompassing leverage ratio, which would catch off-
balance-sheet exposures, and whose breach would require near immediate replenishment of capital 
buffers rather than using it as a reporting tool. This reform would primarily target system-wide 
leverage and interconnectedness with the shadow sector. 
The natural consequence of excessive leverage is ever more risk-taking and rent-seeking. Leverage, 
in combination with the general opacity of bank balance sheets and asset substitution which, in the 
case of the PRC, means very high levels of interconnectedness with the shadow sector in a myriad of 
visible and more crucially invisible ways, creates serious information asymmetries between bank 
management and their monitors (shareholders, creditors, and regulators). This not only exacerbates 
threats to the health of the regulated sector, but also the trend to bury risks in the shadow sector. 
245 For this reason, we have provided an extensive explanation of why a well-calibrated leverage 
ratio, boosting equity capital requirements to a reasonable level, followed by abolition of existing 
lending restrictions can prove an effective measure for controlling rent-seeking. It would also help to 
smooth up the leverage cycle while it would improve bank governance and NPL management. As 
regards bank lending, extension of credit that is based on equity funding as much as deposits will 
seek higher interest rates 246 for riskier lenders, applying a natural constraint on lending to SOEs 
and thus improving the quality of bank-lending books as much as reversing SOE-lending biases. 
Moreover, we have come to view the reform of the silo approach to financial regulation as an 
essential step in the modernization of China’s regulatory regime and the building up of a regulatory 
architecture that is fit to meet the challenges of the emerging PRC economy and financial sector. We 
have thus recommended reforms that range from a “big bang” approach: shifting to objectives-
based regulation from the current sectoral approach and the establishment of a fully-fledged 
macroprudential council (that has direct and unfettered access to all financial-stability information, 
including a register of shadow-banking claims) to a number of evolutionary and essential steps. The 
latter would include the introduction of effective early-intervention and resolution frameworks and 
the granting of critical competences to the PBOC as a LoLR and the Deposit Guarantee Scheme as a 
likely resolution authority, both with a view to strengthening the microprudential regime as much as 
boosting systemic stability. 
The suggested architecture would include a conduct/consumer-protection regulator with extensive 
powers. A consumer-protection agency will be able to guard against financial fraud cases and 
enforce the attendant legal and regulatory regime regards of any registration/licensing 
requirements. Full implementation of our proposals will amount in the end to an ambitious 
redesigning of the PRC financial sector to better absorb future risks and allow the PRC to take bolder 
initiatives to reform its economy, while aiding at the same time its attempts to make the Renminbi a 
global reserve currency. 247 
1International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2016). 
2This term is used to describe a phenomenon whereby lots of bad debts have accumulated on bank 
books owned by various actors in the real economy. An inability to tackle bad debts prevents firms 
from borrowing (and banks from lending) money to finance investment, even where that investment 
is guaranteed to produce a return, because of the earlier excessive borrowing and resulting in fragile 
capital structures. Firms with large debt-equity ratios will therefore pass up valuable investment 
opportunities, even where those opportunities would lead to an increase of the firm’s net value. 
Where bank capital falls (e.g. due to asset repricing), it will prove extremely difficult for a bank to 
escape debt overhang and worthwhile investments will be sacrificed in favour of asset sales and 
deleveraging. See Myers (1977), pp. 147–75. 
3IMF (2014), pp. 74–8. 
4A recent authoritative analysis of the historical development of the Chinese shadow-banking 
sector, legal underpinnings, and risks is Shen (2016b). Thus, for the purpose of further analysis, we 
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